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Abstract 
 
Recounting one’s memory is common in everyday experience, such as in educational 
settings and spatial navigation. How recounting affects memory has largely been 
examined with verbal materials, with few studies examining its effects on visual memory. 
The goals of this dissertation are to investigate the effects of recounting a visual memory, 
first on the person recounting the memory, and second on the ability of the listeners to 
reconstruct the recounted memory. Following an introduction in Section 1, Section 2 
examined how intervening recall affects visual detail memory and whether these effects 
change across time. Intervening recall interfered with visual detail memory in the short 
term, but enhanced it in the long term, suggesting that intervening recall has multiple 
effects on visual detail memory, which change over time. Section 3 showed that memory 
enhancement from intervening recall can generalize across memory attributes to source 
memory, supporting the idea that intervening recall can enhance memory as long as 
fruitful retrieval occurs for the attribute. In addition, there is a positive relationship 
between what occurs during recounting and subsequent memory performance, raising the 
possibility that greater fruitful retrieval leads to greater memory enhancement later on. 
Section 4 examined the usefulness of one’s memory recall for listeners. It demonstrated 
that whereas objects are easy to describe from perception, one’s verbal recall of what was 
seen minutes before is almost useless to third parties. This low utility of one’s verbal 
recall constrains theories about the extension of our memories to the external world and 
highlights the importance of looking to more informative and reliable sources of 
information, particularly in higher stakes situations such as during criminal 
investigations. Overall, this dissertation demonstrates that the way recounting affects 
  v 
memory depends on many factors. Furthermore, while recounting a memory can benefit 
the describer, such benefits do not necessarily extend to the listener, suggesting that 
recounting plays different roles for the describer and the listener. 
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Recounting a Memory 
1. Introduction 
From spatial navigation to eyewitness memory, many activities benefit from an 
excellent visual memory. This memory includes both the semantic gist of what one saw 
(e.g., a coffee shop at the corner) and visual details (e.g., a small green shop with a 
unique design). But how accurate is visual memory? Why are visual memories 
impressive in some cases (e.g., Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2008) and unreliable in 
others (e.g., Lindholm & Christianson, 1998)? In this dissertation, I explore one factor 
that may affect the accuracy of visual memory – the act of recounting.  
Being asked to recount one’s memory is common in everyday experience, such as 
educational settings, spatial navigation, and crime investigation. Much of past research 
examining the effect of recounting was situated in the context of education, relying 
largely on verbal materials. Few have investigated the effects of recounting on visual 
memory – the focus of my dissertation. Besides affecting one’s own memory, recounting 
also serves the purpose of conveying information to someone else. Whether we are giving 
directions to another person or describing what a perpetrator looked like, our descriptions 
guide the listener’s future thoughts and actions. It is, therefore, important that useful and 
accurate information be conveyed. But how good are we at providing that information 
from memory? In this dissertation, I investigate the consequences of recounting a visual 
memory for the person recounting as well as the listener.  
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1.1. Structure of the dissertation  
This dissertation has five parts. Section 1 presents a review of the literature on 
visual memory. This will consist of an evaluation of contradictory findings on the 
capacity and precision of visual memory, a review of the effects of retrieval practice and 
of the utility of memory recounting for third parties. Sections 2 to 4 present three studies 
examining (i) the effects of intervening recall on visual memory, (ii) the effects of 
recounting on item and source memory, and (iii) the utility of verbal descriptions from 
memory for others. Section 5 discusses the theoretical and societal implications of these 
research findings. 
 
1.2. Two views of visual memory  
 Researchers on visual memory have taken different stances on how good people’s 
visual long-term memory is. Whereas some researchers argue that visual long-term 
memory has massive capacity for both gist and details, others propose that it is sparse and 
unreliable. These two traditions of research have typically assessed memory using 
different procedures (e.g., immediate testing vs. testing after repeated probing), a 
difference that may have contributed to the different conclusions.  
High-capacity visual long-term memory has been demonstrated with photographs 
of common objects and natural scenes. In one classical study, Standing, Conezio, and 
Haber (1970) presented participants with 2,560 photographs one at a time. Using a two-
alternative-forced-choice (AFC) task immediately following encoding, Standing et al. 
found that participants could recognize the old photographs with above 90% accuracy.  
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To test whether the impressive performance was limited to memory for the gist of 
images, Brady and colleagues performed a series of studies probing memory for specific 
exemplars using natural scenes or photographs of objects. For instance, Brady et al. 
(2008) asked participants to encode into memory thousands of photographs of 
categorically-distinct objects, presented one at a time for 3 seconds each. In a recognition 
memory test immediately after encoding, participants were highly accurate (above 87%) 
at distinguishing old pictures from new ones, even when the new objects were from the 
same basic-level category. Brady and colleagues estimated that visual long-term memory 
can represent at least 228,000 (217.8) unique codes. Similar findings were observed for 
scene memory (Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010). High-precision visual memory 
is not limited to objects to which people currently attend. Hollingworth, Williams, and 
Henderson (2001) found that people continue to retain in memory previously attended 
objects, even after their eye gaze (and presumably, attention) has moved away from those 
objects (see also Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002).  
 In contrast to studies reviewed above, other studies suggest that visual memory 
can be surprisingly sparse, even for stimuli that people frequently encounter. In one 
demonstration, Nickerson and Adams (1979) probed people’s memory for a US penny, 
an item that participants presumably have had substantial exposure to. Nearly all 
participants (except for one coin collector) made incorrect drawings of the penny from 
memory. When presented with drawings of the real penny and its altered versions, fewer 
than 50% of the participants managed to choose the correct drawing. These findings led 
to the proposal that visual memory contains primarily semantic or categorical 
information, such as the unique bronze color of the penny, and lacks details. Consistent 
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with this idea, when participants are tested on their memory for concrete objects (such as 
drawings of everyday objects) and abstract images, memory is substantially less accurate 
for abstract images (Koutstaal et al., 2003).  
Another line of research suggests that while some complex stimuli yield good 
visual memory, others do not. Whereas memory for faces of familiar people is accurate, 
memory for unfamiliar faces is typically poor. In fact, even small changes in lighting 
condition and viewpoint disrupt recognition of unfamiliar faces (Bruce, Henderson, 
Newman, & Burton, 2001; Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000). Face memory is poor for 
unfamiliar faces even when the memory delay interval is as short as a few seconds or 
hundreds of milliseconds (Jackson & Raymond, 2006; Jackson & Raymond, 2008). 
 In light of these findings, O’Regan and colleagues proposed that instead of 
representing visual details in memory, people rely on the external world as their 
“memory” (O’Regan & Noë, 2001). Visual details are lost as soon as they are no longer 
in view, and when they are needed for a task, people simply open their eyes and look! 
This view may seem extreme, but it receives substantial support from research on change 
detection and visuomotor manipulation tasks. For example, Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark 
(1997) presented participants with alternating images – an original photograph and an 
altered version with a portion of the image altered (e.g., deleted, added, or substituted) – 
and asked participants to spot the difference between the images. The two images were 
separated by a brief blank interval (of about half a second) and presentation of the images 
looped back and forth until the change was found. Rensink et al. found that participants 
needed many repetitions to find the change, especially when the changed information was 
not of central interest to the portrayed scene. This failure to detect changes has also been 
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found using more naturalistic stimuli, such as the substitution of one person with another 
person in a video or during real-world interactions (Levin & Simons, 1997). In another 
line of study, Hayhoe and colleagues measured eye fixation as participants performed a 
visuomotor task (Hayhoe, Bensinger, & Ballard, 1997). Participants had to pick up 
several blocks of various colors and place them in another location. Instead of retaining 
information about multiple blocks in memory, fixation data suggested that participants 
remembered one piece of information at a time, such as the color of the block that they 
were about to move. Minimizing the storage of information in visual memory may be 
advantageous in some ways. Since the external world is readily available to support many 
tasks, it is cognitively economical to rely on the world as an extended memory space 
(Rensink et al., 1997).  
Together, the studies reviewed above suggest that although people are capable of 
representing visual details in memory in some situations, they do not typically use or 
demonstrate that capacity. Additional studies, reviewed next, show that even in situations 
when it is critical to retain precise information in visual memory, such as eyewitness 
testimony, memory is often imprecise.  
 It has long been known that eyewitness memory is unreliable. More than 70% of 
DNA exonerations in the United States involved eyewitness misidentification, which led 
to wrongful convictions (“Innocence Project”, n.d.). Laboratory studies show that people 
have poor source memory, confusing what they saw with what they read (Loftus, Miller, 
& Burns, 1978). Performance on choosing perpetrators from a lineup is also typically 
poor (Lindholm & Christianson, 1998). Several reasons contribute to the poor eyewitness 
memory. First, because memory for unfamiliar faces is poor, an unfamiliar perpetrator 
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will not be easily remembered (Hancock et al., 2000; Patterson & Baddeley, 1977). In 
addition, stress or arousal (Loftus & Burns, 1982), the complexity of a scene or situation 
(Liu and Jiang, 2005; Rensink et al., 1997; Levin & Simons, 1997), and the presence of a 
weapon (Loftus, 1979) may interfere with the encoding and consolidation of visual 
memory.  
 Besides the factors indicated above, one factor that may interfere with visual 
memory in situations such as eyewitness memory is the retelling of one’s memory on 
multiple occasions. Seminal work by Sir Frederic Bartlett in the 1930’s (Bartlett, 1932) 
demonstrates that multiple retellings of one’s memory often contain contradictory 
materials. Expanding on this initial finding, Loftus, Ceci, and others show that memory is 
highly vulnerable to misinformation provided after encoding but before the final memory 
assessment (Loftus et al., 1978; Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, & Bruck, 1994). If retelling 
one’s memory on one occasion introduces misinformation, then this can have a 
deleterious effect on subsequent recall. Studies that uncover high-capacity visual memory 
typically test people’s memory immediately after encoding, allowing accurate memory to 
be preserved. In contrast, witness memories are often subject to multiple retellings. How 
does intervening recall affect visual memory? Would the spectacular memory 
demonstrated by Brady et al.’s (2008) participants be retained if they had undergone an 
intervening recall?  
In the next section I will review two largely independent literatures related to this 
question. One line of research on the “testing effect” suggests that retelling or recalling a 
memory enhances memory and slows down forgetting. The other line of research, on 
memory reconsolidation, suggests that a memory reminder reactivates previous memory 
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and renders it labile and susceptible to change. This review suggests that intervening 
recall may have multiple, and sometimes, opposing effects, on memory.  
 
1.3. Divergent effects of memory retrieval 
1.3.1. The Testing Effect 
The benefit of retrieval practice for long-term retention of information has been 
known for more than a century (Gates, 1917). A recent wave of new research, 
championed by Roediger and colleagues, highlighted the beneficial role of this effect on 
education. For example, Roediger and Karpicke (2006) asked participants to study two 
prose passages. They gave different groups of participants (i) four opportunities to 
restudy the material, (ii) three opportunities to restudy the material followed by a free 
recall test without feedback, or (iii) one restudy opportunity followed by three chances to 
take the same free recall test. Participants then took a final recall test five minutes or a 
week later. Results showed that memory was comparable across groups on the initial 
recall test. In addition, after five minutes, participants who had more restudy 
opportunities performed better. However, after a longer delay (one week later), 
participants given additional retrieval opportunities outperformed those who simply 
restudied the materials. These findings suggest that intervening retrieval improves long-
term retention of learned materials. The testing effect has been replicated and extended in 
later studies using a diverse range of stimuli, including word lists (Carpenter & DeLosh, 
2006), word pairs (Liu, Liang, Li, & Reder, 2014; van den Broek, Takashima, Segers, 
Fernandez, & Verhoeven, 2013; Wing, Marsh, & Cabeza, 2013), general knowledge 
(Carpenter, Pashier, Wixted, & Vul, 2008), short narratives (Agarwal, Karpicke, Kang, 
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Roediger, & McDermott, 2008), foreign language words (Carrier & Pashler, 1992), and 
face-name pairs (Carpenter & DeLosh, 2005; Landauer & Bjork, 1978).  
Several accounts have been proposed to explain why testing is beneficial for long-
term retention. These include the Transfer Appropriate Processing account (Morris, 
Bransford, & Franks, 1977; Bransford, Franks, Morris, & Stein, 1979; Roediger, Gallo, & 
Geraci, 2002), the Retrieval Effort Account (Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Carpenter, 
2009) and the Reconsolidation account (Finn & Roediger, 2011; Finn, Roediger, & 
Rosenzweig, 2012).  
The Transfer Appropriate Processing account suggests that how well something is 
remembered is determined by the extent to which the processing requirements during 
testing match the processing requirements during encoding (Morris et al., 1977; Roediger 
et al., 2002). With regard to the testing effect, when participants are given the chance to 
practice retrieving information from memory, a match of the retrieval practice’s 
processing requirement to that of the final memory test facilitates memory performance. 
On a broad level, the transfer appropriate processing account is consistent with the testing 
effect. However, this account also makes inaccurate predictions regarding the match in 
the testing format between the retrieval practice and the final retrieval. Contrary to what 
the transfer appropriate processing account would have predicted, several studies show 
that the best type of retrieval practice is free recall, regardless of whether the final test 
involves free recall, cued recall, or recognition (Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006). Because 
free-recall requires the highest retrieval effort, these findings lead to an alternative 
account: the Retrieval Effort Account.  
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 The Retrieval Effort Account (sometimes also known as the Elaborative Retrieval 
Account) explains the testing effect in terms of the effort people exert during the retrieval 
practice. At the core of this account is the idea that successful memory retrieval depends 
not just on the strength of the memory trace, but also on the accessibility of this trace to 
retrieval (Bjork, 1975). Accessibility increases as a function of retrieval effort. Because 
retrieval practice encourages more elaborative retrieval processing than restudy, it allows 
for more cues to be associated with the material and more retrieval routes to the to-be-
retrieved material (Bjork, 1975; Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006). With test practice, the 
material to be retrieved on the final test can thus be more easily accessed. This account 
not only predicts the basic testing effect, but also explains why the testing effect is 
greatest when the retrieval practice involves free recall, rather than cued recall or a 
multiple choice test.  
More recently, Finn and Roediger (2011) suggested that memory reconsolidation 
contributes to the testing effect. When a memory is retrieved and hence reactivated, it 
becomes labile and susceptible to change. This memory will then need to be 
reconsolidated (Dudai, 2004). Finn and Roediger (2011) suggest that once information is 
retrieved at test practice, memory becomes labile. What occurs right after retrieval leads 
to the testing effect. In their study, participants studied Swahili-English vocabulary pairs 
and were later given either a restudy opportunity or a cued recall test. Critically, 
following restudy or successful retrieval, participants were presented with a blank screen, 
a neutral picture or a negative picture. These images were shown to differentially affect 
memory consolidation in the cued recall condition (i.e., negative images were known to 
facilitate consolidation of recently acquired memory; Anderson, Wais, & Gabrieli, 2006). 
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In a final test, participants demonstrated the testing effect – memory was better following 
a cued recall test than following a restudy opportunity. The crucial finding is that the 
testing effect was greater when negative pictures were used during retrieval practice, 
supporting the idea that reconsolidation contributes to the testing effect. Finn and 
Roediger propose that a successful retrieval of the learned information renders that 
information labile and therefore allows the memory to be strengthened during the re-
encoding of the information that had just been successfully retrieved. 
The different accounts presented above are not mutually exclusive. Liu and Reder 
(2016) proposed that the testing benefit stems from both the retrieval and re-encoding 
processes. In an fMRI study, participants encoded semantically-unrelated English word-
pairs and were either given restudy or test opportunities while being scanned. Brain 
activity during retrieval practice was a better predictor of subsequent memory 
performance than that during restudy trials. Liu and Reder also examined brain regions 
that were associated with retrieval and those associated with re-encoding after retrieval. 
Brain activity associated with retrieval consistently predicted subsequent correct recall, 
whereas brain activity associated with re-encoding did not predict subsequent correct 
recall if participants had already successfully recalled the word multiple times. These 
results suggest that the testing effect involves both retrieval of previous memory and re-
encoding of the information to memory.  
Each account of the testing effect presents an explanation for why retrieval 
practice can benefit long-term retention. While these benefits of testing on memory are 
undeniable, it is important to note situations when retrieval can be detrimental instead. 
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The memory reconsolidation literature, which highlights such situations, will be 
discussed next.  
 
1.3.2. Interference through reconsolidation  
 Retrieval of a memory, while at times beneficial, can also interfere with the 
original memory through reactivation and reconsolidation.  Specifically, when a reminder 
of a memory (e.g., through the presentation of a cue) is presented, it reactivates the 
memory as it is retrieved. Upon reactivation, the memory trace becomes labile and 
susceptible to change for a certain period of time, typically less than six hours (Schiller et 
al., 2010; Duvarci & Nader, 2004; Walker, Brakefield, Hobson, & Stickgold, 2003). 
Through protein synthesis, memory is reconsolidated (Nader, Schafe, & LeDoux, 2000; 
Suzuki et al., 2004). New information introduced during this period may alter the 
previous memory trace, producing interference (Dudai, 2004; Diekelmann, Büchel, Born, 
& Rasch, 2011; Schiller et al., 2010).  
 Memory interference via reconsolidation is evident in non-human animals such as 
rodents (Nader et al., 2000), chicks (Summers, Crowe, & Ng, 1997; Litvin & Anokhin, 
2000), and fish (Eisenberg, Kobilo, Berman, & Dudai, 2003). For example, Nader et al. 
(2000) paired a tone with foot-shock. Through conditioning, rats exhibited a fear 
response when presented with the tone. Twenty-four hours after the establishment of this 
memory, the rats were presented with the tone alone as a reminder cue. To disrupt protein 
synthesis, Nader et al. infused anisomycin, a protein synthesis inhibitor, into the 
amygdala immediately after the reminder cue or after several hours of delay. Anisomycin 
infusion immediately with the reminder cue (but not after a delay) disrupted the learned 
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fear memory, demonstrated by a lack of freezing response in subsequent testing sessions. 
These results suggest that when memory is reactivated, it is susceptible to disruption by 
protein synthesis inhibitors. Reactivation and reconsolidation are also seen in spatial 
learning in rodents (Suzuki et al., 2004).  
 Memory interference via reconsolidation has also been demonstrated in humans, 
even without the use of protein synthesis inhibitors (Schiller et al., 2010; St. Jacques,  
Olm, & Schacter, 2013; Kindt, Soeter, & Vervliet, 2009). Schiller et al. paired a shock to 
the wrist with a specific colored square, establishing conditioned fear in participants. One 
day later, all participants underwent extinction training whereby the colored square was 
presented repeatedly without the shock. However, for some participants, prior to 
extinction training, the colored square was presented once as a reminder either 10 
minutes or 6 hours before extinction training. Note that 10 minutes falls within, but 6 
hours falls outside of, the memory reconsolidation window. Fear memory was probed one 
day later. Participants who received the reminder 10 minutes before extinction training 
showed diminished fear response compared with participants who received no reminder, 
or who received the reminder 6 hours before the extinction training. These effects lasted 
at least a year. Thus, fear memory can be updated with non-fearful information presented 
when the memory is reactivated. 
 Studies reviewed above raise the question of how misinformation introduced 
during an intervening memory recall affects the original memory trace and hence, 
subsequent memory performance. Misinformation is defined as misleading information 
(Loftus, 2005) that, when presented to a person after initial encoding, impairs subsequent 
memory performance (i.e., the misinformation effect; Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Though 
  13 
this effect is often interpreted in terms of source memory error, it could also reflect 
reconsolidation of the original memory when it is reactivated by the misinformation. 
Consistent with this possibility, Chan, Thomas, and Bulevich (2009) demonstrated that 
when a witnessed event is recalled, it is more susceptible to interference from 
misinformation introduced afterwards. They suggested that recalling the memory 
reactivated the memory, causing it to become labile and susceptible to change. Once 
memory was reconsolidated, the misinformation became incorporated into the original 
memory and impaired subsequent memory performance.  
Misinformation studies are often conducted by having the researchers introduce 
the misinformation (e.g., Chan et al., 2009; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Pickrell, 
1995; Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994). On the other hand, the misinformation 
can be introduced by the participants themselves. For example, studies on children’s 
memory suggest that misinformation can be spontaneously introduced by children 
themselves during memory retrieval (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998a; Reyna, 1995).  In adults, 
describing a face they saw earlier led to worse memory of the described face relative to 
the not-described face. Though this finding is sometimes interpreted in terms of altered 
coding (i.e., from visual to verbal codes) of the original memory (Schooler & Engstler-
Schooler, 1990, “verbal overshadowing”), it may also arise because the verbal description 
contains misinformation that gets incorporated into the original memory. Support for this 
latter explanation can be gleaned from a recent large-scale replication, involving 31 labs, 
of the verbal overshadowing effect (Alogna et al., 2014). The replication showed that 
memory impairment from verbally recalling the perpetrator’s face was larger when there 
was a delay after an event was witnessed and before a verbal description was provided, 
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compared to when the verbal description of the perpetrator was provided immediately 
after witnessing the event. Given that memory may have weakened during the delay, it 
raises concerns about whether spontaneous misinformation occurs, leading to memory 
interference later on.  
In summary, retrieving one’s memory before a final memory test may have 
opposing effects. Retrieval can enhance subsequent memory through the testing effect, 
but it may interfere with memory via reactivation and reconsolidation. With the exception 
of a few studies on faces and other pictures, these findings have primarily been observed 
with verbal materials (such as prose passages or foreign vocabulary learning) or in tests 
of fear memory. How recalling one’s visual experience affects visual memory is less 
understood.   
 
1.3.3. Retrieval of visual memory  
 In this section, I review studies that examined effects of retrieval on visual (as 
opposed to other forms of) memory.  
 
1.3.3.1. Testing effect on visual memory  
Studies that used visual stimuli have found evidence that intervening retrieval can 
benefit subsequent memory performance. Carpenter and Pashler (2007) asked 
participants to study two maps for a memory test. One map was restudied, the other was 
studied once and then given retrieval practice. For retrieval practice, participants were 
shown the map with a feature omitted and had to recall the missing feature and its 
location. In the final test, participants drew the maps from memory. The participants were 
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better at reproducing the map that received intervening testing than the one that was 
restudied.  
Even memory for basic visual features such as colors benefits from the testing 
effect. Sutterer and Awh (2016) presented participants with 400 unique shapes of real 
objects such as a dinosaur and a kiwi bird. The pictures were colored in one solid color 
that could be found on a color wheel. After the presentation of every 10 pictures, 
participants were (i) given a retrieval practice where they were shown a white version of 
the object and had to choose the color on the color wheel that the object was previously 
presented in, (ii) a control condition that involved no further presentations of the objects, 
or (iii) a restudy opportunity in which they could view all 10 objects with their 
corresponding colors again. At final testing, participants recalled the color of a higher 
proportion of the objects that they were previously tested on, relative to the other 
conditions. This finding suggests that the testing effect increased the accessibility of color 
memory. 
Despite these findings, retrieval practice has been shown to incur a cost to 
memory in some cases. Such a cost is commonly demonstrated with the Retrieval-
Induced Forgetting (RIF) effect (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 2000; Ciranni & Shimamura, 
1999). Specifically, recalling information can impair memory for related but unrecalled 
information. Ciranni and Shimamura showed participants 4 circles, 4 triangles, and 4 
crosses that each had a distinct color and location on a wheel. After initial study, 
participants were given retrieval practice where they were asked to recall one of the 
features (e.g., color) of a shape for a subset of the stimuli (e.g., 2 circles) with the non-
tested features as cues (e.g., shape, location). In a final test they had to recall the 
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previously asked about feature (color) of all the stimuli. Ciranni and Shimamura found 
that memory was better for the items that received retrieval practice, but was impaired for 
items related to them (i.e., the other 2 circles that were not tested in the intermediate 
phase). When the subset of stimuli was given restudy opportunities instead, no 
impairment of related items was observed at final testing. This study suggests that 
retrieval practice can facilitate retention of memory for individual visual stimuli, but 
incur a cost to memory for related but untested items. 
 In summary, retrieval practice can benefit subsequent visual memory. However, 
the intervening test may incur a cost to related but untested items.  
 
1.3.3.2. Reconsolidation effects on visual memory 
As reviewed in Section 1.3.2., reactivation and reconsolidation can interfere with 
memory. This finding extends to visual materials. Specifically, studies on rodents have 
found that object recognition memory is subject to reconsolidation (Akirav & Maroun, 
2006; Rossato et al., 2007). For example, microinfusion of anisomycin (a protein 
inhibitor) into the ventromedial prefrontal cortex immediately after the reactivation of 
object memory impairs object memory (Akirav & Maroun, 2006). Infusion of anisomycin 
into the hippocampus in rats also interferes with object memory (Rossato et al., 2007). In 
people, recognition memory for content in a TV show that they had seen was impaired by 
misinformation introduced by the experimenter only if the memories had been reactivated 
beforehand (Chan & LaPaglia, 2013). Similar results were shown in memory for what 
was seen on a museum tour (St. Jacques et al., 2013). One day after going on a museum 
tour, some participants’ memories were reactivated by seeing pictures that they had taken 
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on the tour. After which, they were presented with false images that they had not seen 
previously on their tours. On the final day of testing, participants whose memories were 
reactivated before being exposed to the false images had higher false alarm rates for the 
false images, compared to those whose memories were not reactivated before the false 
image presentation. These results suggest that new information can be incorporated into 
the original visual memory trace after its reactivation. Having said this, the number of 
human studies that have examined interference effects on visual memory from 
reconsolidation are still few in number (Elsey, Van Ast, & Kindt, 2018). Thus, it leaves 
open the question of whether these interference effects can be generalized across other 
types of visual stimuli. 
 
1.3.4. Retrieval effects across memory attributes 
Besides examining the generalizability of recounting effects across domains 
(verbal and visual), one could also extend this examination to different aspects of a 
particular memory. Past work showing enhancement from intervening testing on visual 
memory has mainly demonstrated a facilitation of visual item memory (e.g., individual 
objects). Items in the world rarely occur in isolation, however. They typically appear in 
the context of something else, like the environment in which it is seen. This raises the 
question of whether intervening retrieval affects source memory in a similar way to that 
found for item memory.  
Past research has found evidence that if source information is retrieved during an 
intervening retrieval test, a testing effect can be observed for source memory later on 
(Brewer, Marsh, Meeks, Clark-Foos, & Hicks, 2010). This research did not examine item 
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memory, making it unclear whether intervening retrieval has comparable effects across 
attributes of a memory. The retrieval effort account (Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; 
Carpenter, 2009) proposes that effort exerted to retrieve a memory enhances the memory. 
By this logic, the effects of intervening retrieval should apply similarly to both item and 
source memory as long as effort is exerted to retrieve both types of information. Whether 
this is indeed the case remains to be tested.  
 Recounting a memory could, therefore, have multiple effects on memory, and 
these effects may be generalizable both across material (e.g., verbal and visual) and 
across different attributes of the memory trace (e.g., item and source information). 
Sections 2 and 3 of this dissertation will examine the effects of recounting a visual 
memory on one’s memory. 
 Though most of the existing research has focused on what recounting does to 
one’s own memory, in our daily lives we often recount a visual memory as part of social 
communication. But how well can people convey information about what they had seen? 
To what degree can we rely on someone else’s memory recall? As reviewed next, 
addressing this question has both theoretical and societal implications.    
 
1.4. Usefulness of one’s memory recounting for third parties 
In our daily lives, an important function of recounting one’s memory is to provide 
information to other people. Providing descriptions of what one had seen is common 
when giving directions, reporting a crime, and telling a story. But how well can we 
convey information in visual memory to others? Studies that have examined this question 
are few, and those that have done so have found seemingly contradictory results. 
  19 
Work that analyzed eyewitness descriptions from police records suggests that 
witnesses typically provide accurate but sparse information in their descriptions (Van 
Koppen & Lochun, 1997). Witnesses tend to give accurate, but general descriptions such 
as the perpetrator’s gender, race, and build, while leaving out more specific information, 
such as the perpetrator’s facial characteristics. Thus, although accurate information may 
be provided, its sparseness is of little use to law enforcement who use it to search for the 
perpetrator. 
Laboratory studies have examined the utility of one’s recounting of a visual 
memory to others by measuring how well third parties can identify the perpetrator based 
on the description a witness provides. In one study (Christie & Ellis, 1981), researchers 
showed participants a target face for 60 seconds, and afterwards had them write down a 
description of the target face in as much detail as possible. If their descriptions missed out 
any of five key features (forehead/hairstyle, eyes, nose, mouth, and chin), the participants 
were prompted to provide information about the missing features in their descriptions. A 
group of judges was then given the participants’ descriptions and asked to select the 
target face from an array of faces. All in all, judges were able to identify about half of the 
target faces, suggesting that when witnesses are allowed to look at the visual stimuli for a 
significant period of time, and are probed immediately after with specific prompts, their 
verbal descriptions can be useful for third parties. 
In general, previous research directly examining the utility of verbal descriptions 
are few, and those that have done so, have mainly focused on faces as stimuli. Faces, 
especially unfamiliar ones, are notoriously difficult to remember (Bruce et al., 2001; 
Hancock et al., 2000). Much of facial recognition also depends on recognizing the 
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configuration of the features in the face (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987), a type of 
information that is hard to verbalize. This raises the question of whether the usefulness of 
verbal descriptions is enhanced for visual stimuli that are more memorable and easily 
describable, such as photographs of common objects. 
 
1.5. Summary 
 The contrasting outcomes, and often limited focus of past studies that have 
investigated how recounting a memory can change subsequent memory, highlight the 
importance of examining this question in order to better understand memory. Studies that 
have found testing benefits from intervening retrieval, for example, have primarily been 
done in the context of education and thus used verbal stimuli, limiting the generalizability 
of the testing benefit to other domains. Although there have been studies that examined 
how intervening recounting affects visual memory, they are few and are limited in several 
ways. These studies do not separate memory for visual details from memory for basic 
categories. Studies that have found benefits from recounting evaluated memory at a 
coarser level (e.g., Carpenter & Pashler, 2007) compared to other studies that have found 
interference from recounting (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). Carpenter and 
Pashler (2007), for instance, recorded position accuracy of the locations of objects on the 
maps in terms of whether the object was placed in the correct quadrant of the map and in 
the correct position relative to other features on the map. Schooler and Engstler-Schooler 
(1990), on the other hand, asked participants to select the target face from an array of 
similar faces, essentially testing more detailed memory. Without specifically separating 
exemplar (i.e., detail) memory from category memory, it leaves open the question of 
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whether intervening retrieval affects memory for visual details in a different way than 
that for category information.  This is the primary research question that I address in 
Section 2. In addition to this question, the variety of temporal delays between intervening 
retrieval and final memory test in past studies make it difficult to compare across studies 
and determine whether the enhanced benefit observed with a delay after recounting in 
studies using verbal material also extend to studies using visual material. I also address 
this question in Section 2.  
Assessing the generalizability of the effects of intervening retrieval additionally 
involves questions about whether recounting similarly affects different attributes of 
memory as well. As discussed in the literature review above, past studies have either 
examined the effects of recounting on item or source memory (e.g., Brewer et al., 2010). 
Without examining the effects on both item and source memory in a single study, it is 
difficult to know whether intervening retrieval has similar effects across memory 
attributes. While the leading account of the testing effect – the retrieval effort account – 
seems to suggest that item and source memory should be affected similarly as long as 
retrieval effort is exerted for both types of information during recounting, this prediction 
has not yet been tested. This is the question I will address in Section 3. 
 The act of recounting is done more often for the purpose of conveying 
information to someone else, rather than to be used as a mnemonic device for oneself. 
The dearth of past research that has examined the utility of verbal descriptions for others 
makes it unclear exactly how well one can convey information about what was seen to 
someone else. In particular, using stimuli that are more easily described and more 
memorable than faces (a common type of stimuli used in past studies), are people able to 
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produce useful descriptions for third parties so that the latter can identify what the former 
had seen? I address this question in Section 4 of my dissertation.  
Besides examining the usefulness of one’s verbal descriptions for others, there is 
also the question of whether one’s verbal recall has any correspondence to one’s 
subsequent recognition accuracy. This question has implications for a U.S. Supreme 
Court guideline (Neil v. Biggers, 1972) suggesting that a more accurate prior description 
by a witness should imply that their subsequent identification is also more reliable. Past 
findings, however, show a poor correspondence between recall and recognition, raising 
doubts about the accuracy of the U.S. Supreme Court’s guideline. On that note, in Section 
4, I investigate whether the usefulness, and therefore accuracy, of one’s recall has any 
correspondence to one’s ability to recognize the visual stimulus later on. A direct 
relationship between participants’ verbal recall and their subsequent recognition accuracy 
will lend support to the argument that verbal recall and visual recognition rely on similar 
sources of memory. 
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2. Section 2 	 	 Recounting a visual memory is common in daily life. Past studies have shown that 
recounting a memory can facilitate subsequent memory, yet most studies focused on 
verbal materials or conflated category memory with memory for visual details, leaving 
open the question of whether visually-specific interference effects on visual detail 
memory may occur with recounting. Section 2 presents a set of experiments that answer 
this question. These experiments investigate how intervening retrieval affects detail 
memory and how the effect changes across time. This design allowed for the testing of 
competing theories, such as the testing effect and interference accounts. Using this 
procedure, we showed that intervening recall has multiple effects on visual memory, 
which change in magnitude across time. 
  Section 2 was published in 2018: Tan, D. H., & Jiang, Y. V. (2018). How visual 
memory changes with intervening recall. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 
[Epub Ahead of Print]. https://doi.org/10.1177/1747021818808524. The article is 
reproduced here in its entirety. 									
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Abstract 
Being asked to recount a visual memory is common in educational settings, spatial 
navigation, and crime investigation. Previous studies show that recounting one's memory 
can benefit subsequent memory, but most of this work either used verbal materials or 
conflated category memory with memory for visual details. To test whether recounting 
may introduce visually-specific interference effects, we tested people's memory for 
photographs of objects, but introduced an intervening phase in which people described 
their memory. We separated memory for the specific exemplar from memory for the basic-
level category. Contrary to recent findings on maps and colours, the intervening retrieval 
practice did not consistently strengthen exemplar memory of objects. Instead, recounting 
one's visual memory appeared to introduce interference that sometimes cancelled the 
benefit of increased retrieval effort. Delaying the final memory test by 24 hours increased 
the benefit of retrieval practice. These findings suggest that intervening retrieval has 
multiple effects on visual memory. Instead of being a snapshot, this memory constantly 
changes with retrieval practice and with time. 
 
Keywords: visual memory, intervening recall, testing effect, verbal overshadowing 
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Introduction 
Memory is traditionally assessed in two stages. First, people encode pertinent 
information to memory. Next, their memory is tested following a delay. This two-stage 
procedure overlooks the fact that people frequently recount their memory between 
encoding and the final test, a process that may alter memory. The past decade has seen a 
surge of research on effects of such intervening recall. Entitled “the testing effect,” this 
new line of work demonstrates dramatic enhancement of memory by intervening retrieval 
practice (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). The benefit stems largely from increased effort 
people exert during retrieval practice, allowing more cues to be associated with the encoded 
material and enhancing its accessibility during final testing (Bjork, 1975; Carpenter & 
DeLosh, 2006). The positive testing effect is sometimes accompanied by retrieval-induced 
forgetting, in which intervening retrieval practice impairs memory for related but not 
practiced stimuli (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 2000). Because much of this work is 
conducted in the context of education, it relies heavily on verbal materials such as word 
lists or passages. Few studies have directly examined effects of intervening recall on visual 
memory, the focus of the current study. 
 Two reasons suggest that the testing effect may be similar between verbal and 
visual memory. First, the leading theory of the testing effect – the retrieval effort account 
– makes no reference to the type of material. Effects of retrieval effort are to increase the 
accessibility of the encoded material, as such, they should apply to both verbal and visual 
stimuli. Second, visual memory typically contains both visual details of the image and its 
basic-level category.  The latter is not strictly visual as people tend to name visual objects 
at their basic-level category (Rosch, 1975). This basic-level category, thus, may share a 
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representational format with verbal memory, raising the likelihood that information about 
object category is coded both visually and verbally. As long as basic-level category is a 
part of the memory tested, similar effects are expected for visual and verbal materials. 
Consistent with the material-independent account just mentioned, recent studies on 
visual memory have revealed positive effects of intervening retrieval. Carpenter and 
Pashler (2007) asked participants to study two maps. Subsequently, one map was studied 
once again (restudy). For the other map, participants viewed an altered version and recalled 
missing features. Immediately afterwards participants drew the maps from memory. 
Reproduction was better for the map that received retrieval practice than for the one 
restudied. Extending these findings to colours, Sutterer and Awh (2016) presented 
participants with coloured shapes such as a blue dinosaur or an orange bird. Participants 
saw some of the coloured shapes for a second time, and viewed a white version of the other 
shapes and recalled their colour. In a final test administered either immediately or more 
than a day later, participants recalled the colour of more shapes from the retrieval practice 
condition than from the restudy condition. Finally, Maxcey and Woodman (2014) 
examined retrieval-induced-forgetting using photographs of common objects. They 
presented two exemplars per category (e.g., two sports cars, two muffins) during the initial 
encoding phase, then introduced retrieval of one exemplar (e.g., sports car A), and 
immediately afterwards tested old-new memory for both exemplars as well as objects not 
included in retrieval (e.g., the muffins). Results showed two effects of intervening retrieval: 
it enhanced memory for the exemplar included in retrieval (e.g., sports car A), but impaired 
memory for the encoded but not practiced exemplar (e.g., sports car B), relative to items 
from categories not included in retrieval. These findings suggest that recounting one’s 
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visual memory strengthens that memory, though it may induce forgetting of related but 
not-practiced stimuli. 
An important difference between visual and verbal stimuli, however, suggests that 
intervening retrieval may have unique effects on visual memory. The visual component of 
the memory does not easily lend itself to a verbal code. Neuroimaging studies show that 
visual cortical regions are recruited to retain visual memory. For example, remembering 
faces preferentially activates the fusiform face area whereas remembering scenes 
preferentially activates the parahippocampal place area (Ranganath, DeGutis, & 
D’Esposito, 2004). If the intervening retrieval involves verbalizing a visual memory, such 
as when one recounts a complex graph learned in class or a recent hiking trip, the 
introduction of a verbal code may distort the original visual memory. 
Supporting this interference account is the classic demonstration of verbal 
overshadowing. Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) showed participants a videotape of 
a crime scene and asked some participants to describe the perpetrator’s face. Five minutes 
later, all participants performed a final recognition test of the perpetrator’s face. Those who 
previously described the perpetrator performed worse than those who did not verbalize the 
description in selecting the perpetrator from a lineup. Schooler and Engstler-Schooler 
suggest that having verbally described the faces, participants may have re-coded their 
memory in verbal codes, interfering with visual memory. Verbal overshadowing suggests 
that retrieval practice can interfere with the original visual memory. However, the 
replicability of this effect is controversial (Yu & Geiselman, 1993), raising questions about 
its generality. 
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Interference effects may extend beyond verbal overshadowing. Even when the 
intervening retrieval does not involve verbal re-coding, this act may interfere with visual 
memory if inaccurate or misleading visual details are retrieved. When an experimenter 
introduces misleading information during a retrieval attempt, this information is 
incorporated and re-consolidated to form new, and incorrect memory (Chan, Thomas, & 
Bulevich, 2009). Misinformation effects are widespread in eyewitness memory (Loftus, 
2005). They may also happen when participants themselves, rather than the experimenters, 
introduce misinformation during a retrieval attempt (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998a; Reyna, 
1995). The potential presence of interference may explain why, in Sutterer and Awh 
(2016), retrieval practice increased the number of objects recalled, but not the precision of 
the recalled memory. It may have also contributed to the retrieval-induced-forgetting 
observed in Maxcey and Woodman (2014). 
The above review suggests that intervening recall may have multiple effects on 
visual memory, particularly memory for visual details. However, several factors obscure 
an understanding of these effects. First, although previous studies tested visual memory, 
they did not adequately separate memory for visual details from memory for basic 
categories. Map memory in Carpenter and Pashler (2007) was evaluated at a coarse level, 
in terms of whether certain features were drawn in the correct relative spatial locations. 
Colours used in Sutterer and Awh (2016) could be named, and given the lack of an 
enhancement in memory precision, the enhanced memory accessibility may be attributed 
to the categorical rather than visual component. Maxcey and Woodman (2014) used an 
old-new task, where performance may be supported by both category and detailed memory. 
The lineup task used in Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) is the only one that presents 
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exemplar-level foils at testing. As reviewed above, this line of work shows interference. 
However, memory for unfamiliar faces is notoriously poor (Bruce, Henderson, Newman, 
& Burton, 2001; Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000), limiting the generality of the latter 
finding. One important goal of the current study is to isolate memory for visual details by 
using a forced-choice recognition task that includes exemplar-level foils. 
A second limitation of the previous studies is the variety of temporal delay between 
intervening retrieval and the final memory test. Most common is an immediate test 
(Carpenter & Pashler, 2007; Maxcey & Woodman, 2014; Sutterer & Awh, 2016). Some 
administered the test more than one-day later (Sutterer & Awh, 2016’s Experiment 3). This 
factor makes it difficult to compare across studies. In the larger literature on the testing 
effect, an increase in the delay interval is known to strengthen the testing effect. In fact, 
Roediger and Karpicke (2006)’s classic study found a testing effect using passages only 
after a delay (2 days or 1 week later). Whether analogous effects are seen with visual 
stimuli are unclear. An examination of delay interval is theoretically and practically 
important. Theoretically, it allows us to uncover effects that may be apparent only after a 
delay. Practically, this research has implications for memory tasks in applied situations 
(e.g., classroom learning; eyewitness testimony), which often extend over long delay 
intervals. The second goal of the present study is to investigate effects of delay interval by 
administering both immediate and 24hr-delayed tests. 
 
Experiment 1 
 This experiment establishes the basic experimental procedure. Stimuli were 
photographs of real objects (Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2008; Maxcey & Woodman, 
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2014). These stimuli not only yield rich visual memory, but also permit a straightforward 
separation of category and exemplar memory. The procedure consists of three phases: 
encoding, intervening cued recall, and recognition. In Phase 1 (encoding), photographs of 
objects were shown one at a time for encoding. All objects were semantically distinct. For 
example, the encoding phase could not contain two different apples; this differs from 
Maxcey and Woodman (2014) who presented two exemplars per category for encoding. 
Next, in Phase 2 (intervening recall), participants typed out a description for a subset of the 
objects. Finally, in Phase 3 (final test), we assessed recognition memory for all objects. To 
isolate exemplar memory from memory for basic category, each trial of the final test 
contained four images: the old object, a different exemplar from the same basic-level 
category as the old object, and two exemplars from a new basic-level category. All phases 
were administered on the same day in Experiment 1; a later experiment examined longer 
delays between Phases 2 and 3. 
With the design above, we computed two types of visual memory. Category 
memory was indexed by the proportion of times that participants chose the correct category 
– either the old object or the exemplar foil, rather than the new category. Exemplar 
(detailed) memory was indexed by the proportion of times that participants chose the old 
object rather than the exemplar foil. In probability terms, exemplar memory was computed 
as P(old object | correct category).  Our research focus is primarily on exemplar memory, 
a type of memory likely distinct from verbal memory. We examined whether intervening 
cued recall enhanced this memory, as expected from recent studies on the testing effect, or 
whether it interfered with exemplar memory, as expected from verbal re-coding or 
misinformation effects. 
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Method 
Participants. Participants in this study were students from the University of 
Minnesota, all Native English speakers, naïve to the purpose of the study, had normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity, normal colour vision, and no history of neurological or 
psychiatric conditions. No participant was tested in more than one experiment. Study 
protocol was approved by the University of Minnesota IRB. 
         Sample size. A power analysis was conducted, using the power.t.test function in R, 
based on Experiment 1 of Sutterer and Awh (2016), with a reported Cohen’s d of 3.64 (p. 
835, t(11) = -6.03). A sample size of 6 achieves a power greater than 0.80. In addition, to 
counterbalance experimental materials across conditions in this study, sample size needs 
to be in multiples of 12. Based on these considerations, each of Experiments 1A-C tested 
12 participants, and subsequent experiments that examined additional factors tested 24 
participants. The final sample size fluctuated slightly due to participant signups. 
         Thirty-seven participants completed Experiment 1. There were 13 in Experiment 
1A (10 females and 3 males, M = 19 years old, SD = 1.1), 12 in Experiment 1B (8 females 
and 4 males, M = 19.5 years old, SD = 1.3), and 12 in Experiment 1C (10 females and 2 
males, M = 19.5 years old, SD = 2.0). 
         Equipment. Participants were tested individually in a room with normal interior 
lighting. They sat approximately 40cm away from a 19” CRT monitor (resolution 
1024x768 pixels; refresh rate 75Hz). The experiment was programmed using Psychtoolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) implemented in MATLAB (www.mathworks.com). 
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         Materials. Photographs of objects were sampled from Brady and Oliva’s object 
database (http://cvcl.mit.edu/MM/stimuli.html). There were 2 exemplars from 310 distinct 
object categories. 
         Procedure and Design. Participants were tested in three phases, separated by 2 
minutes between phases (Figure S2.1.). 
 
 
 
 
Figure S2.1. A schematic illustration of the encoding, cued recall, and recognition phases. 
A. The encoding phase presented each object at a pace of 1s/image. All images came from 
different basic-level categories. B. An example of the intervening cued recall phase. 
Participants were asked to type out a description of the named object that they saw in the 
preceding phase. C. The recognition phase with the old object, an exemplar foil, and two 
between-category foils not seen previously. Information about the dimension of stimuli was 
not actually shown on the display. 
  
         (1) Phase 1: encoding. In the first phase, participants viewed a series of 
photographs presented at the center of the screen (24.6ºx24.6º), at a pace of 1s/image. They 
were asked to remember the objects. To ensure that they engaged in the task, we asked 
them to monitor occasional image repetitions. The sequence contained 170 images, 
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including 150 objects that appeared once, and 10 fillers that appeared twice. The 170 
images were presented in a random order. The fillers were included for the repetition 
detection task and were not used in subsequent phases. The same 10 categories served as 
fillers for all participants, leaving us with 300 categories from the image set. A random half 
of the 300 categories was assigned for encoding and the other half as foils in the testing 
phase (phase 3). This assignment was reversed for half of the participants. The 150 target 
objects were categorically distinct at the basic level. Half of the participants encoded one 
of the exemplars of a given category, while the other exemplar served as an exemplar foil 
in the testing phase. This was reversed for the other half of the participants. Object 
categories and exemplars used for targets and foils were fully counterbalanced across 
participants. 
         The three versions of the experiment differed in minor ways. In Experiments 1A 
and 1B, photographs were presented visually only. Participants pressed a button whenever 
they detected a repetition. In Experiment 1C, a voice naming the object accompanied the 
photograph. The voice was added to ensure a clear correspondence between the verbal cues 
used in Phase 2 and the objects. The audio files were edited to last no longer than 1s. The 
audio tied up the computer processor, preventing online keyboard responses. Participants 
therefore kept a count of the number of repetitions and reported that number at the end of 
Phase 1. 
         (2) Phase 2: intervening cued recall. A random third of the encoded objects (N=50) 
were used in the second phase. The assignment of stimuli for inclusion in Phase 2 was 
counterbalanced across participants. In this phase, participants were shown the written 
name of an object on the screen. A voice announcing the object’s name was played 
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alongside in Experiment 1C. Participants were asked to type out a detailed description of 
the named object they saw in Phase 1. After they finished typing they clicked “OK” to 
proceed to the next one. No feedback was given. To further increase recall effort, 
Experiments 1B and 1C included an additional instruction for participants to describe the 
objects in such a way that someone else could pick out the objects based on their 
description. 
         (3) Phase 3: final memory test. The final memory test included 150 trials. On each 
trial, four objects were presented, one in each quadrant (image size: 14.7ºx14.7º; the center 
of each image was 11.7º from fixation, horizontally displaced by 7.9° and vertically 
displaced by 8.6° from fixation). One object, the old object, was previously presented in 
the encoding phase. Another object was from the same basic-level category as the old 
object, but was a new exemplar (the “exemplar foil”). The other two objects were two 
exemplars from a basic-level category not presented previously (the “between-category 
foils”). The position of the four objects were random. Participants were asked to click on 
the object they saw before. A tone provided feedback.  
Results 
1.     Encoding phase 
Participants conducted a repetition detection task in Phase 1. For Experiments 1A 
and 1B where participants pressed a button whenever a repetition was detected, mean hit 
rate was 77% (S.E. = 3%) and mean false alarm rate was 2% (S.E. = 0.5%). For Experiment 
1C where participants tallied the total number of repetitions, mean repetitions detected was 
7.3 (S.E. = 2) out of 10. Repetition detection rates were also high in subsequent 
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experiments. Participants reported 8.5 repetitions in Experiment 2, 10 in Experiment 3, 10 
in Experiment 4A, and 9.4 in Experiment 4B. These results verified that participants were 
engaged in the encoding task. 
2.     Intervening recall 
The verbal descriptions participants provided frequently contained a mixture of 
accurate and incorrect descriptions. To assess the accuracy of the description, we asked 
three coders to identify the object participants described. The coders were shown 
participants’ descriptions along with the old object and the exemplar foil. Coders accurately 
identified just 57% of the old object (S.E. = 1%), a level close to but significantly higher 
than chance, t(36) = 47.75, p < .001. Similar low levels of coder accuracy were seen in 
Experiment 2 (59%), Experiment 3 (57%), Experiment 4A (61%), and Experiment 4B 
(59%). Thus, verbal descriptions participants gave were not useful in guiding a third 
person. However, the results do not mean that participants’ own memory was poor – the 
description was given without knowing the nature of the exemplar foils, so participants 
could not have anticipated key features necessary for the coders’ task. In fact, coder 
accuracy was considerably lower than participants own recognition rates (see Final 
memory test section). 
When analyzing coders’ performance based on participants’ recognition results in 
the third phase, coders were significantly above chance (63%) for images that participants 
themselves successfully identified later on, t(36) = 9.05, p < .001. The coders’ accuracy, 
however, declined to a level significantly below chance (39%) for objects to which 
participants later chose the exemplar foil instead of the target, t(36) = 6.44, p < .001. This 
suggests that when participants had poorer exemplar recognition memory, their earlier 
  36 
verbal description of the objects contained misinformation, misguiding coders to choose 
the exemplar foil more often than the target. Similar results were obtained in subsequent 
experiments and will not be further reported. 
3.     Final memory test 
On each trial of the final memory test, participants were shown an old object, a new 
exemplar from the same category as the old object (“exemplar foil”), or two objects from 
a new category (“category foils”). Responses could fall into any of these three types (Table 
S2.1.). Two of the responses reflected correct category memory. Hence category memory 
was computed as the proportion of trials that participants chose the correct category (the 
old object or the exemplar foil) out of all choices. Exemplar memory was computed among 
trials that participants chose the correct category. It was the proportion of trials that 
participants chose the old object out of trials where a correct category was chosen.  
 
Figure S2.2. Recognition memory results from Experiment 1 for objects included and not  
included in the intervening recall phase. Category memory was the proportion of trials  
where the correct category was chosen (either the old object or the exemplar foil) out of 
all trials. Exemplar memory was the proportion of trials where the old object was chosen  
out of trials where the correct category was selected. Left: Results from all three versions.  
Middle: Category memory results from Experiments 1A, 1B, and 1C. Right: Exemplar 
memory results from Experiments 1A, 1B, and 1C. Error bars show ±1S.E. of the mean. 
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As shown in Figure S2.2., intervening cued recall had opposite effects on category 
memory and exemplar memory. An ANOVA on type of memory (category or exemplar), 
intervening recall (included or not included), and experimental version (1A, 1B, or 1C) 
revealed a significant interaction between type of memory and intervening recall, F(1, 34) 
= 57.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .63; there was no three-way interaction, F(2, 34) = .77, p > .40. 
We next separately analyzed category and exemplar memories. For category 
memory, an ANOVA on intervening recall and experimental version revealed a significant 
main effect of recall status, F(1, 34) = 107.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .76, an effect that did not 
interact with experimental version, F(2, 34) = 1.86, p > .15. Performance was 12% higher 
for objects included in Phase 2 than for those not included. In contrast, exemplar memory 
showed the opposite. The main effect of intervening recall, F(1, 34) = 5.17, p < .02, ηp2 = 
.13, which did not interact with experimental version, F < 1, was driven by a 3% reduction 
in performance for objects included in the intervening recall.   
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Table S2.1. Mean percentage of trials where participants chose the old object, the 
exemplar foil, or one of the category foils during the recognition phase (phase 3), for 
objects included and not included in the preceding intervening cued recall phase (phase 
2). Standard error of the mean is shown in parenthesis. 
Discussion 
The cued recall procedure revealed different effects on category and exemplar 
memory of visual objects. Objects included in the cued recall phase were associated with 
better category memory than those not included in the cued recall. The enhanced category 
memory is consistent with previous studies that used maps (Carpenter & Pashler, 2007), 
colours (Sutterer & Awh, 2016), and objects (Maxcey & Woodman, 2014). The finding 
falls in line with the testing effect. This enhancement may also be attributed to the nature 
of the intervening recall. The cue used in that phase was categorical, which re-exposed 
participants to the category information of the objects. Thus, it is ambiguous whether the 
enhanced category memory is due exclusively to the testing effect or additionally to a re-
exposure of the category label. This ambiguity does not affect the interpretation of 
exemplar memory because the cue provided no information about which exemplar was old. 
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The reduction in exemplar memory suggests that recounting one’s memory can be 
detrimental, which outweighs the benefit of increased retrieval effort. The source of the 
detrimental effects may lie in verbal re-coding or the introduction of misinformation from 
inaccurate recall. The next experiment presents a replication of these findings along with 
an initial test on the role of verbal re-coding due to verbalization.  
Experiment 2 
Perhaps the most surprising finding of Experiment 1 was the lack of a positive 
exemplar memory benefit for objects recounted in the intervening phase. If anything, 
exemplar memory was impaired for the recounted objects. This impairment may have been 
due to verbal re-coding from verbally recounting the objects during the intervening recall 
phase. Experiment 2 aims to replicate this finding and examine the role that verbalization 
plays in producing this effect on exemplar memory. In Experiment 2, we investigate 
whether the lack of a positive effect, from recounting, on exemplar memory extends to 
objects that are recalled but not verbally described as well. To this end, we included two 
types of trials in the intervening phase. In one type, participants were asked to visualize the 
cued object and type out a verbal description, as before. In the second type, participants 
were only asked to visualize the cued object, minimizing verbal re-coding. As in 
Experiment 1, the final test was administered on the same day, and it involved a 4-
alternative-forced-choice (4AFC) recognition task.  
Method 
         Participants. Twenty-four participants, 16 females and 6 males, completed 
Experiment 2 (M = 19.1 years old, SD = 1.0).           
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Design and procedure. This experiment was the same as Experiment 1C, except for 
Phase 2. Specifically, of the 150 encoded objects, a random subset of 100 was included in 
Phase 2. On each trial of the cued recall task, participants were cued with the object name 
and asked to visualize the object they saw from the encoding phase. To increase the 
accountability of visualization, participants were asked to indicate whether they were 
highly confident, somewhat confident, or not confident that they had visualized the exact 
picture shown to them earlier. For a random half of these 100 objects, a window with the 
name of the object appeared after the confidence rating, and participants typed out a 
description of the object to enable someone else to identify it. For the other half of the 
objects, a verbal description was not requested. Instead, the next cue was presented 
immediately after the confidence rating. Thus, all 100 objects were visualized, and a 
random half of these were also described verbally. The other 50 objects were not included 
in Phase 2. Assignment of stimuli to conditions was randomized and counterbalanced 
across participants. 
Results 
 
 
Figure S2.3. Recognition memory results from Experiment 2. Objects were separated  
based on whether they were visualized, visualized and described, or not included in Phase  
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2. Error bars show ±1S.E. of the mean. 
 
 Replicating Experiment 1, an ANOVA on recall condition (not included, 
visualized, or visualized+described) and memory type (category or exemplar) revealed a 
significant interaction, F(2, 46) = 15.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .41. As shown in Figure S2.3., 
category memory was enhanced by intervening recall, F(2, 46) = 30.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .57. 
It was about 12% better for both objects visualized and described, and those visualized 
only, than objects not in recall, t(23)s > 6.19, ps < .001. The former two conditions did not 
differ from each other, t(23) = 0.57, p > .50. In contrast, exemplar memory was slightly 
reduced by intervening recall, though this difference did not reach significance, F(2, 46) = 
1.59, p > .20. Objects visualized and described had a 3.7% decline in exemplar memory 
than those not in recall, a marginally significant effect, t(23) = 1.87, p < .08. The deficit 
was 1.7% for those visualized only; this was not significant, t(23) = 0.76,  p > .45.  
Discussion 
 Intervening cued recall once again facilitated category memory but not exemplar 
memory. This pattern held both for objects visualized and described, and those visualized 
only. The similarity between these two conditions suggests that the act of intervening 
retrieval, rather than verbalization, is the primary driver behind the findings. The robust 
facilitation of category memory is consistent with previously observed testing effect, or 
with the possibility that memory is enhanced because participants were re-exposed to the 
category information. Unlike several recent studies on this topic, however, the 
enhancement did not extend to exemplar memory. If anything, exemplar memory showed 
a small decline of about 3%, an effect that reached significance in Experiment 1 but not in 
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Experiment 2. This finding provides initial evidence that intervening cued recall may 
introduce multiple effects: an increase in retrieval effort may be overridden by interference 
effects from the act of intervening retrieval. Due to the uniqueness of this finding in the 
recent literature on visual memory, we attempted a third replication in Experiment 3 using 
a simpler recognition task.  
Experiment 3 
 The first two experiments used a 4AFC procedure to probe recognition memory. 
Exemplar memory was computed by restricting the analysis to trials in which participants 
chose the correct category. Although this design allowed us to simultaneously gauge 
category memory and exemplar memory, the presence of new categories during testing 
may have introduced extraneous effects. Experiment 3 aims to replicate the key findings 
of the first two experiments regarding exemplar memory. To this end, we simplified the 
final testing into a 2AFC procedure, in which only the old object and an exemplar foil were 
included.  
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four new participants completed Experiment 3. There were 
13 females and 11 males (M = 19.8 years old, SD = 1.7). 
 Design and procedure. This experiment was the same as Experiment 1C except for 
a change in the final testing phase. Instead of being presented with four options, on each 
trial participants saw two options presented side by side on the horizontal meridian (the 
center of each image was 7.9º away from fixation). One option was an old object they saw 
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earlier, the other was an object from the same category (i.e., exemplar foil). The 
participants’ task was to click on the object they saw before. 
Results and Discussion 
 Similar to the first two experiments, we did not observe a positive testing effect 
(Figure S2.4.). Exemplar memory for objects recounted was 2.8% lower than those not 
recounted, a difference that was not significant, t(23) = 1.33, p > .19.  
 
 
 
Figure S2.4. Recognition exemplar memory results from Experiment 3 for objects included  
and not included in the intervening recall phase. The final test included two choices: the  
old object and an exemplar foil. Error bars show ±1S.E. of the mean.  
 
 Together, the first three experiments showed an absence of the typical testing effect 
for exemplar memory. This was not simply a null result. The sample size was large - 85 
combined across all experiments, a sample size adequate to detect a testing effect 
comparable in size to Sutterer and Awh (2016; 73 participants across three experiments). 
Exemplar memory was numerically lower for objects included in the intervening recall 
than for those not included. This reached significance in one experiment. This finding 
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contrasts with the memory enhancement observed recently for maps (Carpenter & Pashler, 
2007), colours (Sutterer & Awh, 2016), and objects (Maxcey & Woodman, 2014). 
Experiment 4 
 The lack of a testing effect from the first three experiments may suggest that the 
retrieval effort account does not apply to exemplar memory. However, the finding is also 
compatible with the possibility that a testing effect was offset by interference from verbal 
re-coding or misinformation. One way to test this possibility is to increase the memory 
delay between Phases 2 and 3. The bifurcation model (Kornell, Bjork, & Garcia, 2011) 
suggests that when the final test is delayed, the testing benefit is larger because retrieval 
practice strengthens memory of the practiced items, protecting them from delay-induced 
forgetting. This is exactly the pattern seen in previous studies using verbal materials (Liu 
& Reder, 2016; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006; Wheeler, Ewers, & Buonanno, 2003). Here 
we investigated whether the same is true with exemplar memory. 
 Two experiments were administered. In both experiments the delay between Phases 
2 and 3 was increased to 24 hours. Experiment 4A was identical to Experiment 1C in its 
use of a 4AFC final test; Experiment 4B was identical to Experiment 3 in its use of a 2AFC 
final test. These experiments were conceptual replications of each other. If a testing effect 
on exemplar memory is observed with the delay, it would suggest that intervening recall 
could have long-term faciliatory effects on memory.  
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Method 
Participants. The 24 participants in Experiment 4A included 19 females and 5 males 
(M = 19.6 years old, SD = 1.7). The 24 participants in Experiment 4B included 16 females 
and 8 males (M = 20.3 years old, SD = 2.1). 
Design and procedure. Other than a change of the delay interval between Phases 2 
and 3 to 24 hours, Experiment 4A was identical to Experiment 1C, whereas Experiment 
4B was identical to Experiment 3. The final memory test was a 4AFC in Experiment 4A, 
permitting separate assessment of category and exemplar memory. The final memory test 
was a 2AFC in Experiment 4B, a simpler procedure focusing exclusively on exemplar 
memory. 
Results 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S2.5. Recognition category and exemplar memory results from Experiment 4A (left- 
4AFC task) and recognition exemplar memory results from 4B (right-2AFC task) for  
objects included and not included in the intervening recall phase. The memory delay 
between Phases 2 and 3 was 24 hours. Error bars showed ±1S.E. of the mean. 
 
Following a 24-hour delay between the intervening cued recall and the final test, 
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S2.5.). To enable a direct assessment of the modulating effect of delay, the following 
analysis included delay interval as a between-subject factor. 
1. 4AFC: immediate (Experiment 1) vs. 24-hr delay (Experiment 4A) 
 Category memory was better for objects included in the intervening recall than for 
objects not included. This was true both when the final test was immediate and when it was 
delayed by 24 hours, though the effect was stronger in the latter case. An ANOVA with 
intervening recall as a within-subject factor and memory delay as a between-subject factor 
showed a significant main effect of intervening recall, F(1, 59) = 251.18, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.81, as well as a significant interaction, F(1, 59) = 5.66, p < .05, ηp2 = .09. Intervening recall 
enhanced category memory by about 16.8% with a 24-hour delay (t(23) = 12.89, p < .001), 
compared to 12% without a delay.  
 Adding a 24-hr delay flipped effects of intervening recall on exemplar memory. 
Whereas objects included in the intervening recall yielded 3% worse exemplar memory 
than objects not included (Experiment 1), this difference switched signs to a 6% gain 
following a 24-hour delay (Experiment 4A; t(23) = 3.87, p < .01). An ANOVA on 
intervening recall and memory delay revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 59) = 18.58, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .24. Importantly, the change from negative to positive effects of recounting 
was mainly due to a decrease in exemplar memory for items not included in recall from 
75.6% (S.E. = 1.6%) when there was no delay to 66.9% (S.E. = 1.6%) when there was a 
24-hour delay after intervening recall, t(59) = 3.73, p < .001. Memory for items included 
in recall was similar when there was no delay (M = 72.3%, S.E. = 1.8%) and when there 
was a delay (M = 72.9%, S.E. = 1.7%), t(59) = 0.22, p = .83. 
  47 
2. 2AFC: immediate (Experiment 3) vs. 24-hr delay (Experiment 4B) 
 Replicating the findings from the 4AFC, in the 2AFC task we again found opposite 
effects of intervening recall for immediate and delayed memory tests. The 2.8% numerical 
cost of exemplar memory for objects included in the intervening recall (Experiment 3) 
reversed to a 6.2% facilitation after a 24-hour delay (Experiment 4B, t(23) = 3.80, p < .01). 
An ANOVA on intervening recall and memory delay yielded a significant interaction, F(1, 
46) = 11.38, p < .01, ηp2 = .20. This result was also due mainly to a decline in exemplar 
memory for items not included in recall from when there was no delay (M = 70.5%, S.E. = 
1.5%) to when there was a delay (M = 63.5%, S.E. = 1.4%), t(46) = 3.43, p < .01. There 
was no significant difference for items included in recall when there was no delay (M = 
67.8%, S.E. = 2.1%) compared to when there was a 24-hour delay after intervening recall 
(M = 69.7%, S.E. = 1.7%), t(46) = 0.72, p = .48. 
Discussion 
Inserting a 24-hour delay between intervening recall (Phase 2) and final recognition 
(Phase 3) produced a more positive effect of intervening recall. The already positive effect 
on category memory increased in strength following a 24-hour memory delay. The small 
negative effect of intervening recall on exemplar memory reversed to a positive testing 
effect. These findings are consistent with previous research that used verbal stimuli. Time 
delay appears to enhance the benefit of intervening memory retrieval (e.g., Liu & Reder, 
2016). Importantly, adding a time delay uncovers the positive testing effect that was 
otherwise not detectable in Experiments 1-3. These findings suggest that intervening recall 
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likely slows forgetting of recalled items such that a clear testing benefit on exemplar 
memory emerges only when a delay follows intervening recall test.  
General Discussion 
 Four experiments examined effects of intervening retrieval on visual memory. 
Using a recognition test that isolates exemplar memory from category memory, we showed 
that intervening retrieval facilitates exemplar memory when tested 24-hours later. The 
enhancement is reminiscent of the testing effect typically seen with verbal materials. 
However, when testing is administered immediately, no facilitation is seen. If anything, 
exemplar memory for recounted objects is slightly reduced. This latter finding suggests 
that intervening retrieval may introduce detrimental effects on memory. The detrimental 
effects are anticipated from prior work on the verbal overshadowing effect (Schooler & 
Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and misinformation effect (Loftus, 2005). Thus, exactly how 
intervening retrieval affects exemplar memory depends on the relative strength of opposing 
effects. Temporal delay modulates the competition between different effects. At longer 
delays, the benefit of increased retrieval effort increases (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), 
producing a net gain. At shorter delays, the detrimental effects of verbal re-coding and 
misinformation may sometimes outweigh the positive testing effect. 
The temporal dynamics revealed in this study are consistent with previous findings 
using word lists (Liu & Reder, 2016) or passages (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006). It supports 
the bifurcation model, according to which an increase in retrieval effort slows down 
forgetting (Kornell et al., 2011). The lack of a testing effect when tested immediately, 
however, contradicts recent studies on visual memory, most of which tested memory 
immediately after retrieval practice (e.g., Carpenter & Pashler, 2007). Several factors may 
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contribute to this contradiction. First, previous studies did not fully distinguish category 
memory from exemplar memory. The old-new memory test, for example, can be supported 
by both. Our study suggests that category memory may be less vulnerable to detrimental 
effects of verbal re-coding and misinformation. Second, the studies differ in the nature of 
the intervening retrieval task, which may have influenced both the benefit from retrieval 
effort and the cost from verbal re-coding and misinformation. Intervening tasks that yield 
highly accurate retrieval, and minimize verbal re-coding and the introduction of 
misinformation, are likely to produce just a positive testing effect. Carpenter and Pashler 
(2007) used an altered map to probe memory for missing features. The similarity of the cue 
to the actual map is likely to minimize inaccurate retrieval. Maxcey and Woodman (2014) 
used a 2AFC recognition task as the retrieval practice, which was also unlikely to introduce 
false information. In contrast, the open-ended visualization and description task used in the 
current study is likely to yield inaccurate retrieval. In fact, an examination of participants’ 
verbal recall in Phase 2 suggests that their recall included misinformation. Coders, as a 
result, were more likely to choose the wrong exemplar when participants themselves chose 
the exemplar foil, suggesting the presence of false memory. This finding is consistent with 
previous work on false memory, which shows that exposure to items either verbally 
(Neushatz, Benoit, & Payne, 2003) or visually (Sapkota, van der Linde, & Pardhan, 2015) 
can lead to the erroneous memory that a related, but not previously presented, item was 
also seen before during the experiment.  In our study, details of a tent seen in the 
participant’s past experiences (outside of the experiment) may have been included in their 
verbal recall of the tent shown during the first phase of the experiment. The inaccurate 
descriptions in the recall may, thus, have increased detrimental effects of the retrieval 
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practice, overriding the positive testing effect. Having said this, the source of the false 
memory in this study is unclear - it could be that people had false memory to begin with, 
or that the intervening recall had introduced false memory. Future studies are needed to 
further examine the nature of object memory. 
Similar to other studies on the testing effect, in our experiments participants could 
be multitasking during the intervening recall phase - recalling the cued objects as well as 
remembering all of the objects seen in phase 1. It is well known that concurrent tasks 
interfere with memory (Sapkota, Pardhan, & van der Linde, 2013). It is therefore possible 
that the act of recalling the cued objects had interfered with memory. However, any such 
interference effect should apply to all objects held in memory, not just to those recalled in 
Phase 2. Thus, generic dual-task interference does not explain why in some cases (e.g., 
Experiment 1) exemplar memory was impaired for only those objects that were recalled 
and not for other objects that were not recalled in phase 2. 
     Our study reconciles apparent contradictions from previous studies on visual 
memory. We suggest that retrieval effort, verbal overshadowing, and misinformation 
jointly affect how intervening retrieval affects visual memory. Temporal delay and the 
nature of retrieval practice affect the relative strength of these factors. The dynamic view 
of intervening retrieval explains a wide range of empirical findings, from detrimental 
effects of verbal overshadowing to the standard testing effect. Because memory for visual 
details is particularly vulnerable to interference from verbal re-coding and misinformation, 
recounting one's visual memory may yield interference effects not typically seen for verbal 
stimuli. 
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 Our study has implications for practical situations involving visual memory, such 
as eyewitness memory, classroom learning of graph or images, and remembering visual 
experience from the past. Recounting one’s visual memory can be beneficial, especially if 
the memory needs to be retained for a long time. However, such recounting may also 
introduce interference, which at shorter intervals may override the benefit of the retrieval 
practice. An important future research question is to identify approaches that minimize 
interference from verbal re-coding and misinformation.  
 The current study used category names to cue object memory during the intervening 
recall phase. As noted earlier, this procedure re-exposed participants to the category label, 
a factor that may have contributed to enhanced category memory for objects included in 
the recall. Memory of the cue could then have faded over the 24-hour delay, and 
contributed to changes in category memory over time. The use of a category cue, therefore, 
made it more difficult to interpret how intervening recall influenced category memory. This 
was the reason we focused on exemplar memory in the present study. Because the 
categorical cue was uninformative of which exemplar participants saw earlier within a 
category, effects of intervening recall on exemplar memory cannot be explained by the 
nature of the cue. Nonetheless, future studies should use non-categorical cues to investigate 
effects of intervening recall on visual memory.  
Conclusion 
 Four experiments suggest that intervening retrieval affects visual memory in 
several ways. One is through facilitation from increased retrieval effort, and the other is 
through interference effects from a likely combination of verbal re-coding and 
misinformation effects. A longer delay strengthens the positive effects from intervening 
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retrieval. These findings support the view that visual memory is dynamic. Despite its high 
capacity and fidelity, visual memory is not a snapshot of one’s previous experience. Rather, 
it is constantly in flux and modified as we think or talk about what we have seen.  
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3. Section 3 
 The experiments in Section 2 revealed that intervening recall can enhance visual 
detail memory in the long run by slowing forgetting of the material. They tapped into 
“item” memory with the testing of individual objects presented in isolation. In the real 
world, however, items typically appear in a scene context (e.g., a bench in a park). Does 
the testing effect similarly affect both item and source memory? Section 3 examines this 
question by superimposing objects against a background scene. We investigated the 
effects of intervening recall on both item and source memory (i.e., which scene an object 
was from).  
Section 3 also addressed one specific aspect of Section 2’s design – the nature of 
the memory cue used for intervening recall. Instead of presenting a category cue which 
re-exposed participants to an object’s category, in Section 3 we used the scene context as 
the cue for intervening recall and examined whether the testing benefit remained.  
Finally, Section 3 provided an in-depth analysis on the nature of intervening recall 
to examine how much the testing benefit relates to “fruitful” retrieval during the 
intervening test. To this end, we classified participants’ verbal descriptions into failed-to-
recall, recalled-without-visual-details, and recalled-with-visual-details. Instead of treating 
all objects included in the recall phase as a single condition, we examined whether the 
nature of recall was related to how much memory enhancement occurred later on. 
Together, these experiments generalized and deepened the research from Section 2.  
Data reported in this section are from an article in preparation for submission. The 
paper is reproduced in its entirety.  		
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The generalizability of the testing effect across memory cues and attributes 
 
Deborah H. Tan 
Yuhong V. Jiang 
 
Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota 
Abstract 
The benefits of intervening retrieval on subsequent verbal memory (i.e., the 
testing effect), have been widely studied. While we previously found that the effect can 
extend to visual material, the benefit was observed under specific conditions where the 
memory cue exposed participants to aspects of the encoded material. Here we examine 
the generality of the testing effect and ask whether 1) the testing effect extends to visual 
stimuli with a more neutral memory cue, and 2) whether the testing effect can be 
observed across different attributes (both item and source information) of a memory. We 
presented photographs of objects to participants, which were superimposed onto 
semantically-unrelated scenes. We then introduced an intervening recall phase with the 
scene as a memory cue. Both the item and its scene pairing had to be retrieved during 
recall. In the final memory test 24 hours later, we tested participants’ memory for the 
objects (item memory), or the scenes (source memory) when presented an old object. As 
found previously, intervening recall enhanced subsequent item detail memory. Source 
memory was also facilitated by intervening recall. Fine-grained analysis of the amount of 
recall from participants suggests that the benefits retrieval has on subsequent memory are 
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related to how much elaboration occurs during intervening retrieval – lending support to 
the retrieval effort account of the testing effect. 
 
Keywords: visual memory, intervening recall, testing effect, item memory, source 
memory 
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Introduction 
The testing effect refers to the finding that attempts to retrieve a memory slow 
down its forgetting. In a classic demonstration, Karpicke and Roediger (2008) first 
trained participants to learn 40 Swahili-English word pairs. Participants then alternated 
between restudying the word pairs and being tested to recall English words when 
presented the Swahili words. Some participants repeatedly restudied the word pairs and 
were only tested on word pairs that they had unsuccessfully recalled before, while others 
were repeatedly tested on the word pairs and only restudied the word pairs they were not 
able to recall previously. In a final test one week later, Karpicke and Roediger found that 
participants who had repeatedly retrieved the items (i.e., during test practice) had better 
long-term retention than participants who repeatedly restudied the items instead. Hence, 
repeated testing slows forgetting of the items and enhances long-term retention. The 
beneficial effect of intervening memory retrieval, or “testing”, has also been observed 
with word lists (Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006), passages (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), 
general knowledge (Carpenter, Pashier, Wixted, & Vul, 2008), and face-name pairs 
(Carpenter & DeLosh, 2005). The leading theory of the testing effect is the retrieval 
effort account, according to which retrieval effort during intervening testing increases the 
accessibility of the encoded material, thereby improving subsequent memory for that 
material (Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Carpenter, 2009). By this logic, the testing effect 
should appear in the long term as long as the retrieval effort exerted during intervening 
testing is sufficient. This account suggests that the testing effect should be generalizable 
across many types of stimuli, such as visual stimuli, and when various aspects of the 
original memory are tested. 
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Several recent studies provide evidence that the testing effect applies to visual 
stimuli. Even though visual memory is not readily describable, and talking about one’s 
visual memory (such as a face one witnessed earlier) can interfere with visual memory 
(Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990), the testing effect manifests in visual stimuli. In 
Carpenter and Pashler (2007), participants first studied two maps. Next, one map was 
studied for a second time (the “restudy” condition), while the other required participants 
to recall missing features (the “testing” condition). Finally, memory for both maps were 
tested. The testing condition yielded better memory of the map than the restudy 
condition. A similar finding was observed in Sutterer and Awh (2016), in which 
participants were exposed to animal shapes in various colors. Next, participants either re-
studied these stimuli again, or engaged in memory retrieval by choosing each shape’s 
color on a color wheel. In a later memory test, participants recalled more colors for the 
tested shapes than for the restudied shapes. 
The testing effect also extends to photographs of common objects. In Tan and 
Jiang (2018; see Section 2), participants were first presented 150 objects for 1s each. 
Next, they were presented with the basic-level category names of a subset of the encoded 
objects and asked to type out a verbal description for those objects seen in the preceding 
phase. Either 2 minutes or 24 hours after intervening recall, participants were tested on 
their recognition memory for all 150 objects in a final forced-choice task. When the delay 
was 2 minutes, intervening recall enhanced category memory, but impaired exemplar 
(i.e., detail) memory. As the delay increased to 24 hours, intervening recall enhanced 
both exemplar and category memory. 
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Although intervening retrieval strengthens visual memory, especially when tested 
after a long delay, the effect has so far been revealed under specific conditions. In Tan 
and Jiang (2018), intervening retrieval was cued based on the category of the objects. 
This method re-exposes participants to the objects’ category, confounding the testing 
effect with restudying. This was a concern when category memory was assessed – better 
category memory for objects included in the recall phase can be attributed either to the 
testing effect, or to re-exposure to the object category. This raises questions about how 
intervening retrieval affects visual memory when a more neutral type of cue is used, 
which eliminates re-exposure. 
Another restriction of previous research on visual stimuli is their focus on one 
type of memory – item memory. Neglected in this research is source memory – the 
contextual information that accompanies a specific visual object. In everyday life, objects 
rarely occur in isolation; they tend to appear in the context of other objects or background 
scene or at a specific time or event. The presence of both item and source memory raises 
the question of whether the testing effect applies to multiple aspects of a memory, and if 
so, whether the effect is qualitatively similar for item memory and source memory. In 
other words, is the testing effect attribute-independent? 
Several studies suggest that item and source memory can be partially dissociated. 
Spencer and Raz (1994) showed that aging has a more deleterious effect on source 
memory than on item memory. They asked healthy young (18-35 years old) and older 
(65-80 years old) participants to remember statements about well-known or fictitious 
people. The statements were presented on pink or blue cards and delivered in room A or 
room B. Subsequently, the researchers tested participants’ memory of the exact statement 
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(item memory) and the color or room associated with the statement (source memory). 
Compared with young adults, older adults’ memory for the statements was similar, but 
their memory for the source of the statement was significantly worse. 
Other studies (Glisky, Polster, & Routhieaux, 1995; Davachi, Mitchell, & 
Wagner, 2003; Fan, Snodgrass, & Bilder, 2003) provided neuropsychological evidence 
that item and source memories rely on different parts of the brain, and thus may have 
different underlying mechanisms. In Glisky et al. (1995), older adults were asked to 
remember sentences spoken in either a male or female voice. Later their memory for both 
the sentences (item memory) and the associated speaker gender (source memory) were 
assessed. Glisky et al. divided participants in two different ways: high vs. low medial 
temporal lobe function based on their performance on four memory tests typically 
associated with medial temporal regions of the brain, or high vs. low frontal function 
based on their performance on five tests typically used to measure frontal lobe function 
(e.g., mental arithmetic from the WAIS-R). Results showed that item memory was better 
in older adults with high rather than low medial temporal lobe function, but source 
memory did not differ between the two groups. In contrast, source memory was better in 
older adults with high rather than low frontal lobe function, but item memory was 
comparable between the two groups. This study suggests that the medial temporal lobe 
and frontal lobe contribute differently to item and source memory, raising the question of 
whether intervening testing will differentially affect each type of memory. 
While differential effects of intervening retrieval on item and source memory are 
a possibility based on Glisky et al. (1995)’s finding, a study by Staresina and Davachi 
(2009) suggests that source memory may not rely solely on the frontal lobe. The 
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researchers examined the role of the hippocampus in the binding of elements in memory 
and found that the hippocampus is involved in associative binding, particularly when the 
different elements (e.g., the object and its color) are separated spatially from each other. 
Their results suggest that, contrary to Glisky et al. (1995)’s finding, the medial temporal 
lobe is important for binding a source to its corresponding object in memory, and thus, 
would be important for source memory as well. 
Other neuroimaging studies have examined brain mechanisms underlying the 
testing effect specifically, including a test of the retrieval effort account (Carpenter & 
DeLosh, 2006). These studies have found that successful retrieval of material during 
intervening tests strengthens the neural representations of that material in the temporo-
parietal regions (see van den Broek et al., 2016 for review). Other studies have found an 
involvement of the frontal lobe, particularly the Ventral Lateral Prefrontal Cortex, during 
intervening testing compared to restudy (e.g., van den Broek, Takashima, Segers, 
Fernández, & Verhoeven, 2013; Wing, Marsh, & Cabeza, 2013). The frontal lobe may be 
involved to suppress inaccurate competing information that is retrieved (see van den 
Broek et al., 2016). Thus, both the frontal and temporal regions are involved in the testing 
effect. On that note, without directly investigating the effects of intervening testing on 
item and source memory, no clear conclusions about whether intervening tests have 
similar effects on item and source memory can be drawn from the past 
neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies. 
Using word lists as stimuli, one recent study found evidence of a testing effect on 
source memory. In Brewer, Marsh, Meeks, Clark-Foos, and Hicks (2010), participants 
listened to two word lists, where words in each list were spoken by either a male or a 
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female speaker. Immediately afterwards, half of the participants were asked to recall the 
words and the gender of the speaker for each word. The other half completed an unrelated 
filler task. In a final recognition test, participants were shown one word at a time and 
asked whether it was previously spoken in a male or a female voice. Brewer et al. found 
enhanced memory for participants who previously recalled the words and the speaker’s 
gender, compared to those who did an unrelated task. This testing effect depended on the 
recall of speaker gender in the intervening phase. In a control experiment, participants 
were only asked to recall the words, but not the gender of the speaker, during the 
intervening phase. In this experiment, no memory enhancement for the speaker’s gender 
was found. Thus, much like item memory, source memory appears to benefit from effort 
being exerted to retrieve that specific type of memory in an intervening phase. Brewer et 
al., however, did not examine how intervening recall affected item memory. Hence, it is 
still unclear whether the testing effect is indeed attribute-independent.  
The main goal of the present study is to examine the generality of the testing 
effect on visual memory. We address two questions. First, is visual memory enhanced by 
intervening testing, when there is no re-exposure of the category information during that 
phase? Second, how does intervening testing affect item memory and source memory for 
visual stimuli? To this end, we ran two experiments. Experiment 1 examined the effects 
of intervening recall on an object’s exemplar and category memory (i.e., item memory). 
Experiment 2 examined the effects of intervening recall on source memory. 
In these experiments, participants were first shown famous scenes – one at a time 
– each with distinct objects superimposed onto them. Scenes were semantically unrelated 
to the objects. In a second intervening recall phase, participants were presented half of the 
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scenes and were asked to type out a description of all the objects that were presented on 
those scenes in the previous phase. As such, the scenes served as memory cues for the 
intervening recall task. This procedure did not re-expose participants to category 
information during the intervening phase, a crucial difference from Tan and Jiang (2018). 
In order to retrieve the objects when presented a scene, participants would have to 
retrieve both the scene and its objects to complete recall. This task asks that participants 
retrieve both item and source memory during intervening recall, making retrieval 
demands for item and source memory similar to each other. 
The final recognition test examined either item (Experiment 1) or source memory 
(Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, four objects were displayed for a four-alternative-
forced-choice task (4AFC): the old object, a different exemplar from the same basic-level 
category as the old object (i.e., within-category foil), and two exemplars from a new 
basic-level category not seen before (i.e., between-category foils). Participants had to 
choose the old object. With this experimental design, we aimed to examine whether 
intervening recall enhances object memory (Tan & Jiang, 2018) even when the memory 
cues did not provide any information about the object categories. 
The final recognition test of Experiment 2 assessed whether the effects of 
intervening recall on source memory are qualitatively similar to that for item memory 
(i.e., intervening testing enhances subsequent memory). To this end, we presented each 
old object one at a time and asked participants to select the scene on which the object was 
shown in the first encoding phase. 
Past studies have shown that the benefits from intervening recall depend, to some 
extent, on accuracy of recall during that intervening phase (Liu & Reder, 2016; Kornell, 
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Bjork, & Garcia, 2011; Rowland, 2014). More accurate recall tends to be associated with 
larger benefits of intervening recall on subsequent memory performance. While useful to 
examine how the accuracy of verbal descriptions produced during recall are related to 
subsequent memory performance, classifying verbal descriptions as being accurate or 
inaccurate was challenging. Descriptions were rarely completely accurate or completely 
inaccurate. There was often a mix of accurate and inaccurate information, making coding 
by accuracy difficult and subjective (see Tan & Jiang, submitted; Section 4). Another 
way of analyzing verbal recall was to focus on the amount of retrieval that occurred 
during the intervening phase. According to the retrieval effort account, the more material 
that is retrieved during a test, assuming retrieval is successful, the more elaboration of the 
material there is, which increases the number of retrieval routes to the material (van den 
Broek et al., 2016; Carpenter, 2009) and enhances subsequent memory. This definition 
has been supported by several studies showing that intervening recall tests produce 
greater long-term retention of material than intervening recognition tests (Bjork & 
Whitten, 1974; Kang et al., 2007). On that note, in both our experiments, we classified 
the verbal descriptions from participants according to the amount of “fruitful” retrieval 
that occurred. For objects that were included in recall, we distinguish among those that 
participants failed to recall (no retrieval), those where only the basic-level category was 
recalled without any elaboration (small amount of retrieval), and those that were recalled 
with additional details (e.g., color of the object - greater amount of retrieval). This finer-
grained analysis of the status of retrieval allows us to more closely examine the retrieval 
effort account, and thus, the generality of the testing effect. 
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Experiment 1 
 This experiment examines whether intervening recall facilitates later visual item 
memory and serves as a conceptual replication for Tan and Jiang (2018). Unlike Tan and 
Jiang (2018), the intervening recall was prompted with a semantically-unrelated 
contextual cue that does not re-expose participants to aspects of the visual objects. To this 
end, participants encoded objects in the context of background scenes. In Phase 1 
(encoding), nine categorically-distinct objects were overlaid on a famous scene. There 
was a total of 72 objects, randomly assigned to 8 scenes. Because the objects were 
randomly assigned, they did not semantically cohere, neither did they relate to the 
background scene. Participants were asked to remember the objects and the scene on 
which they were presented.  
In Phase 2 (intervening cued recall), 4 of the scenes were presented, one at a time, 
to serve as retrieval cues. Upon seeing the scene, participants had to type out a 
description of all the objects that had previously been presented on the scene shown. The 
arbitrary pairing of the scenes and objects meant that any testing effect derived from 
Phase 2 would be attributed to the retrieval practice, rather than to re-exposure to aspects 
of the objects.  
In Phase 3 (final recognition memory test), item recognition memory was 
assessed for all the objects that were shown in Phase 1. Each trial displayed four images 
against a blank background: the old object, a within-category foil, and two between-
category foils. In line with past findings (Liu & Reder, 2016; Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006; Wheeler, Ewers, & Buonanno, 2003), Tan & Jiang (2018) found a greater testing 
effect when there was a 24-hour delay between intervening recall and the final test. 
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Therefore, in this experiment, while Phases 1 and 2 were administered on the same day, 
Phase 3 was administered 24 hours after Phase 2. We examined whether memory for 
objects included in Phase 2 was better than memory for objects not included in Phase 2. 
The use of both category and exemplar foils enables us to compute category and 
exemplar memory. Category memory was calculated as the proportion of times that 
participants chose the correct category (the old object or the within-category foil). 
Exemplar memory was calculated as the proportion of times that participants chose the 
old object, given that the correct category was chosen (i.e., P(old object | correct 
category)). 
A further design feature of Experiment 1 is the analysis of whether there was a 
relationship between what occurred during intervening recounting and the participants’ 
subsequent recognition memory performance. In Experiment 1 two raters separated 
objects cued in Phase 2 into three groups: objects that participants failed to recall, objects 
that participants recalled with just a category name and no elaboration, and objects that 
participants described with visual details. The retrieval effort account predicts that the 
objects recalled with visual details should also show the greatest memory enhancement in 
the subsequent recognition memory test. 
 
Method 
 Participants. Participants in all the experiments were students from the University 
of Minnesota between 18-35 years of age. They were native English speakers, naive to 
the purpose of the study, had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and normal 
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color vision. Participants signed an informed consent and were compensated with extra 
course credit. 
 Sample size. Sample size was determined based on a number of factors. A sample 
size of 24 in Experiment 4 of Tan and Jiang (2018), which also had a 24-hour delay 
between intervening recall and final recognition testing, was adequate to detect a testing 
benefit from intervening recall for both category and exemplar item memory. In addition, 
to counterbalance the experimental materials across the conditions in this study, the 
sample size needed to be in multiples of 16. Given these considerations, we aimed to test 
32 participants in Experiment 1and 32 participants in Experiment 2. Final sample size 
fluctuated slightly due to participant signups. 
Experiment 1 had 34 participants, 26 females and 8 males (M = 19.9 years, SD = 
2.3 years). 
 Materials. Participants were tested individually in a room with normal interior 
lighting. The program was written in MATLAB (www.mathworks.com) and 
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Stimuli were displayed on a 19” CRT 
monitor (1024x768 pixels). 
 Eight photographs of famous scenes around the world were chosen from Google 
Images. They were scenes of the following places: Statue of Liberty, Great Wall of 
China, Mount Rushmore, Eiffel Tower, Taj Mahal, Cloud Gate, Stonehenge, and Sydney 
Opera House. We used famous scenes to minimize the need to learn new scenes, and to 
increase the distinctiveness of the scenes and their effectiveness as retrieval cues.  
Photographs of common objects were sampled from Brady and Oliva’s object 
database (http://cvcl.mit.edu/MM/stimuli.html). The stimulus set contained 144 distinct 
  67 
basic-level categories, each with two exemplars. 72 categories were used during the 
encoding phase. Nine objects were randomly assigned to each scene, reducing the 
semantic association between the scene and the objects. This design is comparable to 
previous verbal studies. In Spencer and Raz, (1994), for example, pink and blue cards 
were paired with semantically-unrelated words. The arbitrary pairing of objects and 
scenes also prevented participants from using schema-aided memory (Hess & Slaughter, 
1990). This minimizes the re-exposure to aspects of the visual objects when the scenes 
are used as retrieval cues. In order to recall the correct object, participants would have to 
retrieve the actual pairing of the scene with that object, instead of making guesses based 
on semantics. 
Procedure and Design. Participants were tested in three phases, separated by two 
minutes between Phases 1 and 2, and 24 hours between Phases 2 and 3 (Figure S3.1.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S3.1. A schematic illustration of the encoding, cued recall, and final memory test 
phases. A. The encoding phase presented eight different scenes with nine categorically 
Great Wall of China 
OK 
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Click the picture you saw before A	 B	 C	
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distinct objects on top of each scene at a pace of 2 mins/presentation. B. An example of 
the intervening cued recall phase. Participants were shown half of the scenes, one at a 
time, and asked to type out a description of all the objects that were presented on that 
scene in the preceding phase. C. The recognition phase with an old object, a within-
category foil, and two between-category foils not seen previously. 24 hours separated the 
intervening cued recall phase and the final recognition test. 
 
(1) Familiarity phase. In order to ensure that all participants were familiar with 
the eight famous scenes before the encoding task, participants were presented the eight 
scenes, one at a time, and asked to name them. They were shown all 8 scenes repeatedly 
until they were able to name all eight scenes. Once they were able to do so, they 
proceeded to the main experiment. 
 (2) Phase 1: Encoding. In the first phase, participants viewed eight different 
scenes (scene size: 34.8ºx34.8º) with nine categorically distinct objects (image size: 
7.7ºx7.7º) superimposed on top of each scene. Each scene and its objects were displayed 
for two minutes each. Participants were asked to remember what the objects looked like 
and on which scene they were placed. They were also told that at a later time, they would 
be asked to recall the objects from the scenes. Across the 8 scenes, there were a total of 
72 objects presented in Phase 1. These objects were randomly selected from the 144 
categories, with the remaining 72 categories of objects used as foils in the final memory 
test. Which set was used for encoding and which as foils were counterbalanced across 
participants. In addition, to control for stimulus differences, we randomly divided the 
objects into groups of 9 objects. The scene on which each group of 9 objects were 
presented was counterbalanced across participants. In addition, for a given object 
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category, the exemplar that was encoded in Phase 1 was counterbalanced across 
participants. The other exemplar which was not encoded served as a within-category foil 
in the final memory test phase.  
 (3) Phase 2: Intervening cued recall. Half of the scenes encoded (N=4) were used 
in the second phase. In this phase, participants were shown a famous scene presented 
previously, and were asked to recall the objects that were presented on that scene in the 
previous phase. They were asked to type out as many details as possible about the objects 
that were on that scene. After they finished typing, they clicked “OK” to proceed to the 
next trial. No feedback was given. The assignment of the stimuli for inclusion in Phase 2 
was counterbalanced across participants, meaning that a given scene, such as the Sydney 
Opera House, was presented as a memory cue for half of the participants, and not 
presented for the other half. The extensive randomization and counterbalancing used in 
this experiment ensured that, across participants, a given object is equally likely to be an 
encoding object or a memory foil, and equally likely to appear against any of the 8 
background scenes. In addition, a given encoded object is equally likely to be included or 
excluded from Phase 2’s recall. The 36 objects paired with the 4 scenes are considered 
“in recall”, whereas the 36 objects paired with the 4 scenes not displayed in Phase 2 are 
considered “not in recall.” 
 (4) Phase 3: Final memory test. The final memory test occurred 24 hours after 
Phase 2. It included 72 trials. On each trial, four objects were presented, one in each 
quadrant (image size: 14.7ºx14.7º; the center of each image was 11.7º from fixation, 
horizontally displaced by 7.9º and vertically displaced by 8.6º from fixation). One object, 
the old object, was previously presented in the encoding phase (e.g., a suitcase). Another 
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object was from the same basic-level category as the old object, but was a new exemplar 
(within-category foil; e.g., a different suitcase). The other two objects were two 
exemplars from a basic-level category not presented previously (between-category foils; 
e.g., two toothbrushes, and toothbrush was never presented in the experiment). The 
positions of the four objects on the screen were random. Participants were asked to click 
on the object that they had seen before. A tone provided feedback about their accuracy. 
 
Results 
On every trial of the final memory test, the participants were shown an old object, 
a within-category foil, and two between-category foils in a 4AFC task. Participants’ 
responses could fall into any of these three options. This allowed us to compute category 
memory and exemplar memory separately (see Method).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S3.2. Recognition item memory results from Experiment 1 for objects included 
and not included in the intervening recall phase. Error bars show ±1S.E. of the mean. 
 
In the first analysis, we combined all 36 objects in recall as one condition, and all 
36 objects not in recall as another condition (Figure S3.2.). An ANOVA on type of 
memory (category or exemplar) and intervening recall (included or not included) 
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revealed only a significant main effect of memory type, F(1, 33) = 25.93, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.44. Participants were more accurate in identifying the category of the object than in 
identifying the exact exemplar. However, there was no main effect of intervening recall, 
F(1, 33) = 0.81, p = .37 and no interaction, F(1, 33) = 0.71, p = .41. Objects included in 
recall were not remembered better than those not in recall, for either category or 
exemplar memory.  
The above analysis treated all 36 objects paired with the 4 retrieval cues (scenes) 
equivalently, regardless of retrieval success. This analysis blurred any effects of retrieval 
success across the different objects. Because not all objects were associated with fruitful 
retrieval in Phase 2, the mere presence of a cue that could have led to their retrieval may 
not have influenced memory.  
To further examine whether what occurs during intervening testing is associated 
with subsequent memory performance, we separated the 36 objects included in retrieval 
into three types. Specifically, two raters determined whether objects previously paired 
with each scene cue were 1) RecalledVisual, i.e., recalled with visual details (e.g., 
“yellow watch”), 2) RecalledNoVisual, i.e., recalled without visual details (e.g., 
“watch”), or 3) FailedToRecall, i.e., not recalled when it should have been (e.g., a watch 
was paired with the Eiffel Tower, but the participant did not recall there was a watch 
when shown the Eiffel Tower). These categories were contrasted with 4) NotInRecall, 
i.e., objects not cued for recall, e.g., an object was paired with a scene that was not shown 
during the intervening recall phase. Some objects were left out from this classification. 
Specifically, 2.5% of the objects that were intrusions, i.e., an object that was recalled but 
was previously paired with a scene that had not been shown during the intervening recall 
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phase. Because they occurred infrequently, they will not be discussed further. Inter-rater 
reliability was high (0.97 in both Experiments 1 and 2). Hence, we used the data from 
only one of the raters in subsequent analyses. Table S3.1. shows the average number of 
trials for each type of recall in Experiments 1 and 2.  
 
Table S3.1. Mean proportion of each type of recall (FailedToRecall, RecalledNoVisual, 
RecalledVisual) out of the 36 objects that were cued in Phase 2 (intervening recall) in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Standard error of the mean is shown in parenthesis. The three types 
of recall add up to a total proportion that is slightly less than 100% because some of the 
cued objects were classified as intrusions. 
 FailedToRecall RecalledNoVisual RecalledVisual 
Exp 1 61.4 (4.5) 16.3 (2.9) 18.7 (3.7) 
Exp 2 67.7 (4.0) 13.1 (3.0) 15.5 (2.8) 
 
 
It should be noted that the raters did not specifically code for the accuracy of the 
recalled details. This is both because what participants reported could be ambiguous, and 
also because we were mainly interested in the amount of visual details as a measure of 
fruitful retrieval. In addition, the small number of stimuli prevented us from further 
dividing the “recall with visual” into smaller categories (e.g., recall with completely 
accurate visual details, recall with some accurate details, and recall with inaccurate visual 
details). How accuracy of the intervening recall descriptions affects subsequent memory 
is analyzed in a separate study described in Section 4 of the dissertation. 
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Figure S3.3. Recognition item memory results from Experiment 1, binned according to 
the type of recall participants did in Phase 2 (intervening recall). Category memory was 
the proportion of trials where the correct category was chosen (either the old object or 
the within-category foil) out of all trials. Exemplar memory was the proportion of trials 
where the old object was chosen out of the trials where the correct category was selected. 
Error bars show ±1S.E. of the mean. 
 
Participants’ category and exemplar memories during the final memory test were 
analyzed based on the nature of the intervening cued recall descriptions that were coded 
(Figure S3.3.). An ANOVA on type of memory (category or exemplar) and recall type 
(RecalledVisual, RecalledNoVisual, FailedToRecall, and NotInRecall) revealed a main 
effect of memory type, F(1, 27) = 10.33, p < .01, ηp2 = .28, with better category than 
exemplar memory. There was a marginally significant main effect of recall type, F(3, 81) 
= 2.59, p = .058, ηp2 = .09. The interaction between the two factors did not reach 
significance, F(3, 81) = 1.42, p = .24. 
To understand how the testing effect manifests for stimuli associated with 
different degrees of retrieval effort, we performed planned contrasts that compared each 
of the three in-recall conditions with the baseline, not-in-recall condition. First, an 
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ANOVA comparing FailedToRecall with the NotInRecall condition, with memory type 
(category or exemplar) as an orthogonal factor, revealed no effect of recall condition, F < 
1, and no interaction with memory type, F < 1. Thus, when cued with a scene and 
participants did not write down anything about an object previously presented on the 
scene, memory for that object did not differ from the baseline, not-in-recall condition. 
This is consistent with the idea that failed recall corresponds to no fruitful retrieval. 
Next, we compared NotInRecall with objects for which participants recalled the 
category name but did not include any further visual details. An ANOVA on recall 
condition and memory type again revealed no main effect of recall condition, F < 1, and 
no interaction, F < 1.  
Finally, objects in which participants recalled visual details along with the 
category label yielded significantly better memory than the NotInRecall baseline, F(1, 
29) = 14.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .34. This effect marginally interacted with memory type, F(1, 
29) = 3.14, p = .087, ηp2 = .10. Post-hoc paired t-tests showed that category memory was 
comparable between RecalledVisual and NotInRecall, t(29) = 1.50, p = .15, but exemplar 
memory was better in RecalledVisual than in NotInRecall, t(29) = 3.55, p < .001.  
 
Discussion 
Using background scene as a context cue for retrieval practice, Experiment 1 
showed no overall memory enhancement of object (item) memory and category memory 
from recounting. This result differs from what was found in Tan and Jiang (2018), which 
used a category cue and found a testing effect for category memory and exemplar 
memory. The absence of a testing effect may have been due to a ceiling effect masking 
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any testing benefits from recounting. Future studies are, thus, needed to determine 
whether there is indeed no memory facilitation from intervening testing with a more 
neutral context cue.  
Having said that, the finer grained analysis of intervening recall does show that 
there is an association between the nature of recounting and later recognition, where 
fruitful retrieval is associated with better subsequent recognition. This was most clearly 
shown in exemplar memory, for objects that participants recalled with visual details. 
Better recognition memory was not evident when participants failed to recall an object 
cued by the scene. In other words, there is memory enhancement in the final recognition 
test for objects where a retrieval route has been established for that object. It should be 
noted, however, that while this positive association between intervening recounting and 
subsequent recognition performance is consistent with the retrieval effort account, it does 
not imply that there is a causal relationship between fruitful retrieval and better memory 
performance later on. 
 
Experiment 2 
 Brewer et al. (2010) found that intervening testing of the source of items can 
benefit source memory later on. They found that participants were better at speaker 
gender discrimination if gender information was tested during the intervening test. In 
other words, intervening recall increased the probability of making correct source 
judgments by participants. As mentioned previously, the paradigm used in Experiment 1 
(encoding and intervening recall) encourages retrieval of not only the item, but also the 
source of the item, in order to do the intervening recall task. This is especially so because 
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the scenes were semantically unrelated to the items, preventing schema-aided guessing 
about the items during recall when presented the scene (Hess & Slaughter, 1990). To 
examine whether source memory enhancement from intervening testing can occur with 
this task, in the third phase of Experiment 2, we administered a recognition memory test 
for the scenes on which the objects were placed (i.e., the sources). If, similar to the results 
observed in Tan and Jiang (2018), memory for the scenes is enhanced for the objects that 
were included in the intervening recall test, it would grant support for the retrieval effort 
account and suggest that the testing effect is attribute-independent, as long as effort is 
exerted to retrieve the attributes during intervening testing. 
 
Method 
 Participants. Thirty-two participants, 26 females and 6 males (M = 20.0 years, SD 
= 1.9 years) completed Experiment 2. 
 Materials. The same objects and scenes from Experiment 1 were also used in 
Experiment 2.  
 Design and Procedure. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except for 
Phase 3 (see Figure S3.4.). On each trial in Phase 3, an object from the encoding phase 
was presented (image size: 4.9ºx4.9º) and the eight different scenes (each scene size: 
6.3ºx6.3º) were presented side by side in a row underneath the object. The positions of 
the eight scenes were random. Participants were asked to click on the scene that the 
object had previously been presented on. A tone provided feedback.  
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Figure S3.4. An example of the recognition phase in Experiment 2. An old object 
previously shown in the first encoding phase (i.e., the blue binder) was shown at the top-
center part of the screen. The eight different scenes were simultaneously presented below 
the old object. The order of the scenes were randomized across trials. Participants were 
asked to click on the scene on which the object was presented previously. 
 
Results 
 On each trial of the final memory test in Experiment 2, participants were shown 
an old object and the eight scenes that were shown in the first encoding phase. 
Participants’ responses were either classified as incorrect (i.e., they selected the wrong 
scene that the object appeared on in Phase 1) or correct (i.e., they selected the scene that 
the object had appeared on in Phase 1).  
  78 
 
 
Figure S3.5. Recognition source memory results from Experiment 2 for objects included 
and not included in the intervening recall phase. Only correct trials are displayed. Error 
bars show ±1S.E. of the mean. 
 
 In the first analysis, we treated all 36 objects cued by the scenes in Phase 2 as one 
condition (included in recall), and compared source memory for these objects with that 
for objects not in recall. As shown in Figure S3.5., participants had better source memory 
for objects included in the intervening recall phase (M = 39.9%, S.E. = 3.6%), compared 
with objects not included (M = 34.0%, S.E. = 3.4%), t(31) = 2.14, p < .05.  
 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Correct
Pr
op
or
iti
on
 o
f t
ria
ls
 
Included Not included
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
NotInRecall FailedToRecall RecalledNoVisual RecalledVisual
Proportion of correct trials binned by phase 2 
recall
  79 
Figure S3.6. Proportion of correct trials during Phase 3 (final memory test) in 
Experiment 2, binned according to the type of recall participants did in Phase 2 
(intervening recall). Error bars show ±1S.E. of the mean. 
 
As in Experiment 1, we analyzed the relationship between intervening recall and 
subsequent recognition memory by separating trials into RecalledVisual, 
RecalledNoVisual, FailedToRecall, and NotInRecall, based on the descriptions provided 
for objects in the intervening recall phase (Figure S3.6.). Presumably, the richer the 
representation, and therefore, recall, of the object during intervening testing, the richer 
the representation of the scene-object pairing in memory as well. An ANOVA on recall 
type (RecalledVisual, RecalledNoVisual, FailedToRecall, and NotInRecall) for the 
correct scene responses showed that there was a main effect of recall type, F(3, 57) = 
34.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .65.  
Further analysis showed that compared with the baseline, NotInRecall condition, 
when participants failed to recall the object in Phase 2, their subsequent source memory 
for the object was marginally worse, t(31) = 1.87, p = .07. In contrast, when participants 
recalled the objects, their source memory was enhanced. This was the case both for 
objects in which only the category label was recalled, t(22) = 4.73, p < .001, and for 
objects in which additional details were recalled, t(26) = 10.70, p < .001. As in 
Experiment 1, better recall during the intervening recall test was associated with better 
source memory performance in the final memory test: source memory was better for 
objects recalled with visual details than objects recalled without visual details, t(19) = 
2.09, p = .05.  
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The above analysis included multiple comparisons. To avoid Type I errors 
associated with multiple comparisons, we also compared the three in-recall conditions, 
entering the levels FailedToRecall, RecalledNoVisual, and RecalledVisual, in that order. 
A strong linear trend was found in the source memory, F(1, 19) = 64.91, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.77, supporting the idea that there is a relationship between the nature of recounting and 
subsequent recognition. 
 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 2, intervening recall facilitated source memory. This result differed 
from Experiment 1 likely because source memory performance was not at ceiling, 
allowing for any benefits from intervening testing to be observed.  
As in Experiment 1, when a more detailed analysis was conducted, an association 
between the nature of recounting and subsequent memory retrieval was found. Objects 
recalled with visual details were associated with the best source memory. Unlike 
Experiment 1, better recognition memory performance was observed even for objects for 
which no visual details were recalled (i.e., RecalledNoVisual). This discrepancy may 
have occurred because in Experiment 1, if the details of objects were not recalled (as in 
RecalledNoVisual), exemplar memory of the object was weak. In Experiment 2, 
however, source memory could still have been strong even when only the category of the 
object was recalled (RecalledNoVisual). For example, when cued with Sydney Opera 
House, participants may remember that they saw a suitcase but not remember any details 
about it (i.e., item memory was weak). Nonetheless, the connection between a suitcase 
and Sydney Opera House would have been retrieved. Hence, memory for the scene-
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object pairing could have been strong even in the RecalledNoVisual condition, eventually 
showing a significant positive relationship between recounting and subsequent 
recognition memory even for that condition in Experiment 2. 
Overall, the results from Experiment 2 show that the testing effect can be 
observed for source memory, and not just item memory (Tan & Jiang, 2018), as long as 
source memory is also tested during recounting. In addition, a greater amount of retrieval 
of an attribute during recounting is associated with greater subsequent memory for that 
attribute. 
 
General discussion 
 In two experiments, we examined the generalizability of intervening recall effects 
on visual memory. Using a neutral memory cue during intervening recall, we found that 
intervening recall did not enhance subsequent item exemplar memory. These results 
differed from that observed in Tan and Jiang (2018), which found an item memory 
facilitation from recounting with a category cue. The lack of memory facilitation from 
recounting with a context cue may have been due to a ceiling effect, preventing the 
observation of any testing benefits that may have resulted. 
         In order for participants to complete the intervening recall task, our study required 
that they recall both the object and the scene that it was paired with. With this design, we 
were able to examine the generality of intervening recall’s effects on source memory. We 
found that unlike item memory, there was no ceiling effect for source memory, allowing 
for the observation of a memory facilitation from intervening recall for source memory. 
These results suggest that recounting visual memory can enhance not just item memory 
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(Tan & Jiang, 2018), but also other attributes such as source memory, if source memory 
is also tested. These results are consistent with previous findings (Brewer et al., 2010) 
which found that source memory was enhanced by intervening retrieval when source 
information was tested during the intervening phase. In other words, as predicted by the 
retrieval effort account, as long as retrieval demand and effort for the memory attribute is 
high enough, intervening testing can enhance subsequent memory for that attribute. 
Whether or not item exemplar memory can be facilitated by recounting with a more 
neutral context cue should be examined by future studies that eliminate the ceiling effect 
observed in Experiment 1. 
 Across both experiments, we showed that there is an association between what 
occurs during recounting and subsequent memory performance. More information 
retrieved during intervening recounting (e.g., when visual details were recalled) was 
related to better recognition memory performance in the final memory test for both item 
exemplar memory and source memory. These findings are consistent with the retrieval 
effort account, which states that the greater the retrieval effort exerted during intervening 
testing, the better the memory enhancement later on (Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006). It 
should be noted, however, that there is an alternative explanation for the data observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2. It is possible, instead, that the association shown between the nature 
of recounting and subsequent memory retrieval was due to certain objects and sources 
being better remembered in general, and thus, showing better memory in both the 
intervening recall phase and the final recognition memory test. Future studies are needed 
to investigate to what degree fruitful retrieval leads to subsequent memory enhancement. 
One way to examine this question is by manipulating the amount of retrieval that 
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participants are asked to do during the intervening recall test and examining how 
subsequent memory performance differs across different amounts of intervening retrieval.  
The generalization of the testing effect to item (Tan & Jiang, 2018) and source 
memory (Experiment 2) seemingly contradict past studies that have dissociated item and 
source memory, suggesting that they rely on different brain areas, and as a result, may 
have different underlying mechanisms (e.g., Glisky et al., 1995; Davachi et al., 2003; Fan 
et al., 2003). As mentioned previously, however, several regions of the brain are involved 
in the testing effect. Therefore, finding a dissociation, where item memory relies more on 
the medial temporal lobe and source memory relies more on the frontal lobe, provides 
little clarity as to whether intervening testing similarly affects item and source memory. 
Our results suggest that whether testing benefits are found for an aspect (or attribute) of 
memory depend more on the process (e.g., being retrieved during intervening testing) 
rather than the nature of the memory itself (e.g., item vs. source). Glisky et al. (1995) 
themselves mention that the dissociation they observed could be explained by what 
information was considered central versus peripheral, since the frontal lobes have been 
found to be involved in the encoding and retrieval of noncentral (i.e., peripheral) 
information (Craik & Jennings, 1992). It is possible that in their study, source 
information was treated as peripheral information, while item information was treated as 
central. This reasoning suggests that the dissociation they found may disappear if both 
item and source information were central to the task. By this logic, their results align with 
our conclusions that if retrieval demands for item and source memory were similar, 
intervening testing may affect them in similar ways as well. 
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         The testing effect has been found to rely on the accuracy of intervening retrieval 
(Liu & Reder, 2016). In our study, we assumed that retrieval was accompanied by some 
level of accuracy. While we could clearly determine that there was no accurate 
information recalled when objects were failed to be recalled, and at least the basic-level 
category of the object was correct for objects that were recalled in some way, we did not 
analyze the accuracy of the details that were recalled. It is possible that some details 
recalled during the intervening phase were inaccurate. However, given that people have 
rich memories for the stimuli used in our study (Brady et al., 2008), it is likely that details 
recalled may have included accurate information. That would explain why we found that 
better memory in the final memory test was related to more information being retrieved 
for both item and source memory in the preceding recall phase. Future studies that 
experimentally quantify the level of accuracy during intervening retrieval are needed to 
more clearly understand the influence that retrieval accuracy has on the testing effect. 
All in all, our results suggest that the effects of intervening testing are 
generalizable to different aspects (or attributes) of visual material. Having said this, 
however, our study is merely a first step in the examination of the generalizability of 
intervening testing effects across attributes. Several other questions should be 
investigated to increase the field’s certainty about how generalizable the intervening 
testing effects are to all attributes of a memory. Firstly, the type of stimuli used in this 
study and in Tan and Jiang (2018), as mentioned before, is one that people tend to have 
rich memories for (Brady et al., 2008). Given that only eight scenes were used, and all 
were famous landmarks, it is conceivable that memory for the scenes would have been 
fairly good. Given the findings from past studies (Liu & Reder, 2016) that enhanced 
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memory from intervening recall may require a certain level of accuracy, future studies 
should replace our stimuli with items (e.g., unfamiliar faces, see Bruce, Henderson, 
Newman, & Burton, 2001; Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000) and sources (e.g., generic 
scenes) that people tend to have poorer memories for. If intervening recall impairs 
memory for both attributes, as would be expected from previous studies (Schooler & 
Engstler-Schooler, 1990), that would lend even more support to the conclusion that 
intervening recall’s effects are attribute-independent. 
         The second question future research should investigate is whether the mechanisms 
underlying memory enhancement (or detriment) for both item and source memory are the 
same. The retrieval effort account is compatible with our findings. Besides this account, 
however, other theories of the testing effect have been proposed. For example, the 
Reconsolidation Account (Finn & Roediger, 2011), which focuses more on a re-encoding 
process rather than the retrieval process, suggests that after the studied material is 
retrieved, it becomes labile (Dudai, 2004). This enables the memory to be strengthened 
by re-encoding of the correctly retrieved information. There has also been evidence that 
both the retrieval and re-encoding processes occur, one after the other, in order to 
produce the testing effect (Liu, Tan, & Reder, 2018). This range of theories present the 
possibility that item and source memory enhancement from intervening testing may have 
different underlying mechanisms from each other. For instance, are both item and source 
memory strengthened because memory for both attributes experienced elaborative 
processing from increased retrieval effort, or are both types of memory strengthened by 
different means? 
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         Finally, future studies should investigate whether category memory is enhanced 
by intervening recall. Our current study did not show the category memory enhancement 
from intervening recall as was observed in Tan and Jiang (2018). The lack of an effect 
was likely due to ceiling effects for category memory. This, in addition to the difficulty 
of interpreting the effects of intervening recall on category memory in Tan and Jiang 
(2018), due to re-exposure of the category information during intervening recall, leave 
open the question of how visual category memory is affected by intervening retrieval. 
         Our study has implications for the way in which we understand how memory 
works. Our findings, together with those in Tan and Jiang (2018), highlight several 
important factors about the effects of intervening recall on subsequent memory. One is 
that intervening retrieval can benefit subsequent memory as long as the memory is 
retrieved during intervening testing. Furthermore, across memory attributes, memory 
enhancement in the final memory test is related to what occurs during prior recounting. 
These findings suggest that in our understanding of how intervening testing affects 
memory, it may be more accurate and useful to examine the processes that the material 
(or memory) undergoes, rather than the ways in which each memory type differs from the 
other. 							
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4. Section 4 
 Sections 2 and 3 explored the effects of recounting on one’s own memory. A 
significant function of recounting, however, is for social communication. We are 
commonly asked to describe what we saw to someone else, raising the question of how 
well one can transmit information to another from our visual memories. Section 4 
presents a set of experiments to investigate how well people can describe visual memory 
to others. In addition, these experiments examined how the content in participants’ verbal 
descriptions might affect the participants’ own subsequent accuracy, a question that was 
not investigated in the previous two sections. Judges were asked to identify the objects 
that participants saw, based on the participants’ descriptions of the objects.  
Using this procedure, we found that although people can provide useful 
descriptions from perception, the utility of the descriptions declines significantly with a 
few minutes delay between when the visual stimulus is seen and when it is described. 
Comparisons of participants’ identification accuracy with judges’ accuracy suggest that 
errors made by both groups stemmed from a common source. These findings highlight 
the danger of placing too much weight on anyone’s verbal reports of what they saw and 
constrain theories about the extension of our memories to the external world.  
Section 4 is currently under peer-review: Tan, D. H., & Jiang, Y. V. (submitted). 
Tell me what you saw: The usefulness of verbal descriptions for others. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. It is reproduced in its entirety here. 				
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Abstract 
Describing what one saw to another person is common in everyday experience, 
such as spatial navigation and crime investigations. Past studies have examined the 
effects of recounting on one’s own memory, neglecting an important function of memory 
recall in social communication.  Here we report surprisingly low utility of one’s verbal 
descriptions for others, even when visual memory for the stimuli has high capacity. 
Participants described photographs of common objects they had seen to enable judges to 
identify the target object from a foil in the same basic-level category. When describing 
from perception, participants were able to provide useful descriptions, allowing judges to 
accurately identify the target objects 87% of the time. Judges’ accuracy decreased to just 
57% when participants provided descriptions from memory acquired minutes ago, and to 
near-chance (51.8%) when the verbal descriptions were based on memory acquired 24hr 
ago. Comparison of participants’ own identification accuracy with judges’ accuracy 
suggests the presence of a common source of errors. The low utility of one’s verbal 
descriptions constrains theories about the extension of one’s memory to the external 
world and has implications for eyewitness identification and laws governing it.  Our 
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limited ability to transmit visual information to someone else, importantly, underscores 
the need to corroborate verbal reports, especially in higher stakes situations, and call on 
more reliable sources of information whenever possible.  
 
 
Keywords: visual memory, misinformation, verbal recall utility 
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Introduction 
Extensive research has shown that recounting one’s recent memory strengthens 
that memory and slows down forgetting. Known as the “testing effect,” this finding 
demonstrates the beneficial effect of memory retrieval for oneself (Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006). Yet in many daily activities, people recount a memory not as a mnemonic device 
for themselves, but to provide information to others. Delivering a lecture, retelling a 
story, giving directions, reporting a crime are such examples. The information provided 
in these recounts may guide the listener’s conceptual development, spatial navigation, 
and crime investigation. With easy access to smartphones and the internet, another 
person’s experience is just seconds away from being part of our own knowledge. The 
increasing reliance on others’ memories leads us to ask: how useful are one’s memory 
descriptions for someone else? This question has rarely been answered; the vast literature 
on memory focuses instead on either the accuracy of one’s own memory or the accuracy 
of memory retrieved together with other people (e.g., Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2010). 
Few have examined how well one’s individual memory recall can be used by someone 
else. 
            It would seem that the utility of one’s memory for other people can be derived 
without much experimentation. For it to be used by others, the memory needs to be 
highly accurate and easily verbalizable. It follows that an articulate person with an 
accurate, verbalizable memory should be able to provide valuable information to 
someone else. Such communicative acts are no doubt highly effective, attested by the 
accumulation of a vast amount of knowledge through civilization and human history. 
Experimental research has therefore examined the type of memory that is less accurate or 
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verbalizable. Concentrated around the 1980-1990’s, this research examined the reliability 
of eyewitnesses’ descriptions of crimes. Though it does not directly reveal the usefulness 
of the witnesses’ descriptions for third-party usage, evidence suggests that the recounted 
information of one’s visual memory may be rather sparse. 
 Van Koppen and Lochun (1997) examined archival data of police records from 
the Netherlands, containing eyewitness descriptions of robberies. The data showed that 
witnesses tend to provide general descriptions of the robbers such as their gender, race, 
and build. The witnesses gave very little specific information about the robbers, such as 
their facial characteristics. When their descriptions were compared with the actual 
robbers’ characteristics, the little information that the witnesses did provide was generally 
accurate. This study suggests that witnesses retain some accurate memory about the 
crime, but their descriptions may be too sparse to be of significant value to others.  
 Several studies have examined the correspondence between a witness’ 
descriptions of a perpetrator – the type of information that detectives may rely on – and 
the witness’ own accuracy in recognizing the perpetrator from a lineup. This question 
was motivated by the US Supreme Court’s guidelines regarding the evaluation of 
identification evidence (Neil v. Biggers, 1972). One guideline includes the accuracy of 
the witness’ prior description of the perpetrator – more accurate prior description 
suggests that the subsequent identification through a lineup should also be more reliable. 
To test whether description accuracy indeed corresponds to one’s own identification 
accuracy, Pigott and Brigham (1985) asked 120 college students to describe a person they 
saw for just 15 seconds. The students were later asked to identify that person from a 
lineup. Pigott and Brigham coded each participant’s verbal description, and evaluated the 
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correlation between the description accuracy and subsequent identification accuracy. No 
relationship was found – participants who provided a better description did not perform 
the lineup task better. The lack of correspondence is consistent with the idea that recall 
(e.g., the description task) and recognition (e.g., the lineup task) do not rely on the same 
information (Pozzulo, Lemieux, Wells, & McCuaig, 2007). It raises the possibility that a 
process beneficial to one’s own memory – recounting an experience – may not yield 
useful information for others. 
  However, because each participant described and was tested on only one target 
face, the correlation between witness description and subsequent identification was 
examined between-participants in Pigott and Brigham (1985). Instead of suggesting a 
general lack of correspondence, the finding may simply indicate that good descriptors are 
not necessarily good identifiers (Wells, 1985).  
Other studies have found some relationships between one’s own identification and 
verbal descriptions. Wells (1985) tested 176 participants using 21 faces. Each participant 
viewed one face and provided a description and an identification. Wells found a modest 
correspondence between the two measures (r = .27), and attributed the correlation to item 
differences – more distinctive faces yield better descriptions and better identification. 
Other studies (Finger & Pezdek, 1999; Meissner, 2002) found that manipulating 
witnesses’ descriptions by forcing them to provide more elaborate descriptions can 
adversely affect subsequent identification accuracy. Meissner (2002) showed that any 
inaccuracies generated during recall predicted participants’ identification accuracy later 
on. These findings suggest that there is likely some relationship between witness 
description and subsequent identification. To confirm the existence of a correlation, 
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Meissner, Sporer, and Susa (2008) conducted a meta-analysis across 33 articles. They 
observed a small but significant correlation, with an effect size r of .14.  
 The weak correspondence between descriptions from memory and identification 
accuracy, however, suggests that conclusions regarding the accuracy of one’s memory 
during identification need not generalize to the descriptions produced from memory, and 
hence the utility of that memory to others. Unfortunately, studies reviewed above did not 
report how useful the witnesses’ verbal descriptions were. They either did not present 
data on the accuracy of verbal descriptions (e.g., Pigott & Brigham, 1985), or asked raters 
to classify the witnesses’ descriptions as “accurate”, “ambiguous”, or “inaccurate” (e.g., 
Wells, 1985). Although this rating indexes description accuracy, it is not a good measure 
of the utility of the descriptions. A description that is accurate but very general does not 
allow others to identify the specific perpetrator, and a description that is ambiguous may 
misguide others into choosing a foil that matches the inaccurate component of the 
description. A better index of the utility of a description is to examine how well other 
people can identify the perpetrator based on the description the witness provides.  
 Such an index has been used in several studies that examined different methods of 
description. Davies (1986) had sketch artists draw facial composites based on witnesses’ 
verbal descriptions. Subsequently, “judges” were asked to select the target photograph 
from an array of photographs, based on the facial composite. There were six targets and 
18 foils in the array. Judges correctly selected just 1.85 target faces on average. This 
finding shows that there is some, though limited, utility of verbal reports from memory to 
third parties. In another study, Christie and Ellis (1981) showed participants six target 
faces (each participant viewed only one of the six faces). After viewing a face for 60s, 
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participants were asked to write down as much detail as they could about the face. If they 
did not describe any of five key features (forehead/hairstyle, eyes, nose, mouth, and 
chin), the experimenter prompted them to provide information about these features. The 
verbal descriptions were then given to judges, who relied on this information to identify 
the target faces from an array of six targets and 18 foils. Judges were able to identify 
about half of the target faces. This finding shows that when recall is carried out 
immediately after prolonged viewing and is guided by specific prompts, the verbal 
descriptions produced can be useful.  
 In summary, previous research has largely neglected the utility of one’s memory 
to third-parties. Though many studies on the testing effect ask people to describe their 
memory, the purpose of those studies is to identify effects of retrieval effort on one’s own 
memory (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006; Bjork, 1975), rather than the usefulness of the 
descriptions to others. Studies from the 1980’s examined description accuracy, yet the 
work focused almost exclusively on eyewitnesses’ descriptions of the perpetrator’s face, 
and few studies probed the utility of those descriptions to others. 
 The aim of the current study is to directly examine the usefulness of one’s 
memory descriptions to others. We extended previous work on faces to visual stimuli that 
are (i) more memorable, and (ii) more easily described. To this end, we asked participants 
to describe photographs of common objects to enable someone else to identify the 
described objects. The descriptions were conducted under three conditions. In 
Experiment 1, participants described the photographs while viewing them, eliminating 
memory limitation as a source of inaccuracy. In Experiment 2, participants recounted 
memory of the photographs they saw minutes ago. In Experiment 3, recounting was done 
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24 hours after exposure to the photographs. In all cases, the participants’ descriptions 
were given to judges who had to choose the objects participants described in a two-
alternative-forced-choice task (2AFC), including the described object (e.g., a tent) and a 
new exemplar from the same basic-level category as the target (i.e., a within-category 
foil) (e.g., a different tent). We examined the judges’ accuracy as an index of the utility of 
the participants’ verbal descriptions. Figure S4.1. illustrates the study procedure.  
 
 
Figure S4.1. A schematic illustration of the participants’ task and the judges’ task. 
Participants’ task (left panels): In Experiment 1 (top left panel), participants were 
presented photographs of objects one at a time, and asked to describe each object for 
someone else while the object remained on the screen. In Experiments 2 and 3 (bottom 
left panel), participants described the photographs from memory. During the encoding 
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phase, each photograph was presented at a pace of 1s/image. There was then a delay 
(two minutes in Experiment 2, 24hr in Experiment 3). In the next verbal description 
phase, participants were asked to type out a description of the named object that they saw 
in the preceding phase from memory. In the third recognition phase, half of the 
participants in each experiment were given a 2AFC task and the other half a 4AFC task, 
and asked to select the photograph they had seen before. Judges’ task (right panel): A 
photograph of the described object and of a within-category foil were presented to 
judges. A participant’s verbal description of the photograph they had seen was also 
displayed. Judges were asked to decide which photograph the participant had described. 
 
The study design addresses several questions. First, to what degree do previous 
findings from witnesses’ descriptions of faces generalize to photographs of common 
objects? Although witnesses typically provide sparse descriptions of faces (Van Koppen 
& Lochun, 1997), faces are a special category of visual stimuli (Yovel & Kanwisher, 
2004). Unfamiliar faces, in particular, are notoriously difficult to remember (Bruce, 
Henderson, Newman, & Burton, 2001; Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000). In addition, 
face recognition is holistic, relying on the configuration of the spatial relationship 
between various face parts (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). Because configural 
information is difficult to verbalize, essential identification information of a face may not 
be describable. In fact, the conversion from visual to verbal codes of faces is known to 
impair the witnesses’ own memory, in a phenomenon known as “verbal overshadowing” 
(Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). In contrast, non-face stimuli are typically 
recognized based on features (Young et al., 1987), making it more likely that a verbal 
description is useful. Critically, memory capacity for the type of common objects used in 
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this study is extremely high. Using these same stimuli, Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, and 
Oliva (2008) showed that after viewing several thousand photographs, participants could 
identify about 90% of the objects in a 2AFC task, even when the foil was a within-
category foil. They estimated that people could hold 217.8 unique codes in visual long-
term memory. The verbalizability and high-capacity raise the possibility that unlike faces, 
photographs of common objects may yield highly useful, transmissible memory from a 
witness to another person.  
 Second, is there any correspondence between participants’ descriptions, as 
indexed by the judges’ accuracy in choosing what participants saw, and the participants’ 
own identification accuracy? This question pertains to the Supreme Court’s guideline on 
the evaluation of identification evidence (Neil v. Biggers, 1972), but this time on memory 
of objects instead of faces. Eyewitnesses to a crime are typically asked to describe not 
only the perpetrator’s face, but also other crime details, such as what the person was 
wearing and which objects were present (Davies, 1986; Pozzulo et al., 2007). The use of 
objects in the current study allows us to ask the same correspondence question raised 
previously with faces. By asking each participant to describe a large number of objects, 
we can evaluate the correspondence both across-participants and within-participants. In 
particular, do participants who provide better descriptions also recognize more objects 
(Pigott & Brigham, 1985)? For a given participant, are objects that have been given better 
descriptions also identified more accurately? Addressing these questions will reveal the 
utility of one’s visual memory to others, shed light on the transmission of visual 
knowledge across individuals, and elucidate the relationship between different formats of 
coding (visual vs. verbal) in memory.  
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Experiment 1 
 We begin with an experiment asking participants to describe visual objects based 
on perception, with the objects in full view. This is a necessary first step to determine an 
approximate upper bound on the utility of verbal reports, when the descriptions are not 
limited by memory.  
In Experiment 1, participants were shown a set of photographs of categorically 
distinct objects, one at a time. They were asked to describe each object for someone else. 
Typically, in eyewitness situations and everyday experience, people do not know what 
the foils in a line-up, for instance, could be. This makes it difficult to tune encoding and 
verbal descriptions to the more diagnostic features of what was seen. To mimic these 
real-world situations, we instructed participants to describe the objects with as much 
detail as possible, for the purpose of aiding someone else to identify the objects later on, 
without informing them of the nature of potential foils. The participants’ verbal 
descriptions were then provided to judges, who were presented with a photograph that the 
participants described and a foil object that belonged to the same basic-level category as 
the target object. For example, the judge may be presented with a tent that participants 
saw and a different tent that participants did not see. The judge’s task was to identify the 
target object based on the participant’s description. We examined the judge’s accuracy as 
an index of the utility of participants’ verbal descriptions.  
Even though descriptions are based on perception, several factors can limit their 
utility. First, information may be lost when visual representations are converted into a 
verbal code (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). Second, without knowing what the 
foils might be, participants may fail to include diagnostic information in their 
  99 
descriptions. Third, judges may introduce errors when interpreting participants’ verbal 
descriptions and identifying the objects. These factors jointly constrain the accuracy that 
judges can achieve, even when participants’ memories are not a limiting factor.  
 
Method 
 Participants. Participants in all the experiments were students from the University 
of Minnesota between 18-35 years of age. They were native English speakers, naïve to 
the purpose of the study, had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and normal 
color vision. Participants signed an informed consent and were compensated with extra 
course credit.  
 Twelve participants, 8 females and 4 males (M = 22 years, SD = 5.8 years), 
provided verbal descriptions of objects in Experiment 1. 
 Materials. Participants were tested individually in a room with normal interior 
lighting. The program was written in MATLAB (www.mathworks.com) and 
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Stimuli were displayed on a 19” CRT 
monitor (1024x768 pixels) subtending 24.6ºx24.6º.  
Photographs of common objects were sampled from Brady and Oliva’s object 
database (http://cvcl.mit.edu/MM/stimuli.html). The image set contained 300 distinct 
basic-level categories, each with two exemplars. Each participant described 50 
categorically distinct objects. The selection of the 50 categories as well as the specific 
exemplar shown to the participants were counterbalanced across participants.  
 Design and Procedure. After informed consent, participants were led to a testing 
room and provided with the following instructions:  
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“Welcome to the study. You will be shown pictures. When the picture appears on 
the screen, you will also hear the name of the picture being said. Type out your 
description of the object. Once you are done, click “ok.”… 
“Try your best to describe how the object looks like. Take your time and provide a 
description that will allow someone else to identify the object you saw based on your 
description of it.”. 
 
Participants were then shown 50 objects, one at a time, in the upper left corner of 
the computer monitor (image size: 14.7˚ X 14.7˚). A voice naming the object 
accompanied the photograph. A text window opened to the right of the photograph for 
participants to type out a description. Participants had unlimited time to view and 
describe the objects. After they had finished typing, they clicked “OK” to proceed to the 
next trial.  
 Coding of the verbal descriptions. Four judges, including the first author and three 
research assistants, completed the coding phase independently. Each judge coded all 12 
participants’ descriptions, one at a time. Because the photographs used as targets and 
foils were fully counterbalanced across participants, the judges had no information as to 
which photograph was more likely shown to a given participant. That is, the judges were 
blind to the correct answer and their coding depended entirely on the participants’ verbal 
descriptions.  
 Each judge went through 50 trials of each participant’s verbal descriptions. On 
each trial, the judge was presented with the target and a within-category foil. The two 
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photographs were presented side-by-side, 15.7º to the left and right of fixation (each 
image subtended 14.7ºx14.7º). The left/right position was randomized. The verbal 
description the participant provided was presented below the photographs (see Figure 
S4.1.). The judge clicked on the image that they thought the participant saw before 
proceeding to the next trial.  
 
Results 
 The four judges produced highly similar levels of accuracy. Mean accuracy was: 
judge 1 87.5% (S.E. = 3.7%), judge 2 87.8% (S.E. = 3.8%), judge 3 87.2%, (S.E. = 
4.4%), and judge 4 87% (S.E. = 3.9%). The small standard error of each judge indicates 
that the variability in coding across the 12 participants was low. In addition, all judges 
produced mean accuracies within a narrow range. The mean across the four judges was 
87.4% (S.E. = 0.18%). The low variability across judges suggests that their accuracy was 
determined mainly by the quality of the participants’ descriptions, rather than by noise 
introduced by the judges themselves. The high consistency across judges was also 
observed in subsequent experiments, justifying the pooling of data across judges in the 
data analysis.  
Using the mean data across judges as the dependent measure (Figure S4.2.), the 
judges’ accuracy of 87.4% was significantly above chance, t(11) = 9.57, p < .001, and 
significantly below perfect performance, t(11) = 3.23, p < .01. 
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Figure S4.2. Mean judges’ accuracy from Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Chance is 0.5. Error 
bars show ±1S.E. of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 demonstrates that participants are able to provide useful verbal 
descriptions of visual objects, when the descriptions are given while the objects are in 
view. In the absence of a memory demand, participants’ verbal descriptions are useful, 
allowing judges to discriminate the object from a within-category foil. The accuracy of 
the judges – around 87% - is considerably higher than previous findings using faces 
(Davies, 1986; Christie & Ellis, 1981). These previous studies asked people to describe 
faces from memory. Hence, the discrepancy between our results and theirs could be 
explained by a difference between perception and memory (Pigott & Brigham, 1985), and 
by a difference between the type of stimuli described (objects vs. faces).  
 The judges’ accuracy is significantly below 100%, suggesting that visual 
information is lost when participants describe the objects. The loss of information can be 
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attributed to two sources. First, it is not possible for participants to describe all the visual 
properties in words. Second, because participants did not know which features would be 
diagnostic in the judges’ task of identifying the target object, their verbal descriptions 
may not have included all the diagnostic information. Both of these limitations are 
inherent in verbal description tasks. The 87% accuracy (rather than 100%) observed in 
Experiment 1 therefore serves as an approximate upper bound on what can be expected 
when participants describe visual objects based on memory. The next two experiments 
examine the degree of information loss when people describe their visual memory.  
 
Experiment 2 
  Experiments 2 and 3 were part of a project investigating effects of intervening 
verbal recall on participants’ memory of visual stimuli (Tan & Jiang, 2018). In this 
previous study, we showed that describing visual memory could strengthen that memory, 
especially when testing was done after a 24-hour delay. As in other studies on the testing 
effect, Tan and Jiang (2018) focused on effects of verbal description on the participants’ 
own memory. The new focus of the current study is on the value of the verbal 
descriptions for third-parties who did not witness the objects.  
In Experiment 2 participants provided verbal descriptions from memory acquired 
minutes ago. Participants engaged in an initial memory encoding phase, during which 
they saw a sequence of photographs one at a time. Immediately after encoding, 
participants were cued with the name of the photograph and asked to write down as much 
as they could remember about the object. As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to 
describe the objects for someone else’s use. After the verbal description, participants’ 
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own memory for the objects was assessed using either a 4AFC or a 2AFC task. The 
4AFC task presented participants with the target object they encoded, a within-category 
foil, and two exemplars from a new basic-level category not encoded previously (i.e., 
between-category foils). The 2AFC task presented participants with the target and its 
within-category foil. As in Experiment 1, judges were provided with participants’ verbal 
descriptions and had to identify the object in a 2AFC task. This design allowed us to 
examine (i) the utility of participants’ verbal descriptions in enabling the judges to choose 
the target object, and (ii) the correspondence between the participants’ own recognition 
accuracy and the judges’ accuracy.  
   
Method 
 Data were collected as part of a project examining the testing effect on visual 
memory (Tan & Jiang, 2018). That study did not explore the utility of verbal descriptions 
for others. Here we present those data. Additional details on the testing effect can be 
found in Tan and Jiang (2018).  
 Participants. Forty-eight participants completed Experiment 2, which included 
three phases: (i) encoding, (ii) verbal description, and (iii) recognition. Half of the 
participants (18 females and six males, mean age 19.5 years, SD 1.6 years) were tested in 
a 4AFC recognition task in Phase 3, whereas the other half (13 females and 11 males, 
mean age 19.8 years, SD 1.7 years) were tested in a 2AFC recognition task.  
 Materials. Objects were drawn from the same object database as in Experiment 1, 
plus another 10 basic-level categories of objects that served as fillers in the encoding 
phase (see procedure below).   
  105 
 Phase 1: encoding. Participants first engaged in an encoding phase. During this 
phase, participants were presented with a sequence of visual objects at a pace of 
1s/image. Each object was presented at the center of the screen (24.6ºx24.6º). Participants 
were asked to remember the objects. To ensure task compliance, participants were asked 
to monitor occasional repetitions of objects. The encoding sequence had 150 objects that 
were presented once, and 10 filler objects that were presented twice at random intervals. 
The fillers were not included in subsequent phases. For 12 participants, the objects were 
presented on their own, and participants pressed the spacebar whenever they detected an 
object that appeared earlier in the sequence. For the other 36 participants, a voice naming 
the object was presented along with its visual presentation. The voice tied up the 
computer’s processor, preventing it from collecting button presses. These participants 
reported the number of repetitions they detected at the end of the encoding phase. 
Repetition detection accuracy was high (as reported in Tan & Jiang, 2018), suggesting 
that participants had complied with the task instruction. All the objects presented in the 
encoding phase were unique in terms of their basic-level categories. A random half of the 
300 categories was assigned for encoding, while the other half was assigned as foils for 
the recognition phase (Phase 3). The assignment was reversed for half of the participants. 
Object categories and exemplars used for targets and foils were fully counterbalanced 
across participants. 
 Phase 2: verbal description. A random third of the encoded objects (N = 50) were 
used in this second phase. Assignment of stimuli for inclusion in Phase 2 was 
counterbalanced across participants. Participants were shown the written name of an 
object on the screen, and a voice announcing the object’s name was played. Participants 
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were asked to type out a detailed description of the named object that they had seen in 
Phase 1 to enable someone else to identify the object based on their description. After 
they had finished typing, they clicked “OK” to proceed to the next trial. No feedback was 
given.  
Phase 3: recognition memory test. The recognition memory test included 150 
trials, including the 50 objects that participants were cued to recall in Phase 2, and the 
100 objects not included in Phase 2. Our focus in this study is on participants’ recognition 
memory for the 50 objects they described in Phase 2. Memory for the other 100 objects 
was used to probe the testing effect, and data were reported previously (Tan & Jiang, 
2018). 
For a subset of the participants (N = 24), on each trial, four objects were presented 
in a 4AFC task, one in each quadrant (image size: 14.7˚ X 14.7˚; the center of each image 
was 11.7˚ from fixation, horizontally displaced by 7.9˚ and vertically displaced by 8.6˚ 
from fixation). One object was the target object, which participants had seen in Phase 1. 
Another was a within-category foil, and the other two were between-category foils. None 
of the foils were previously presented. The positions of the four objects were random. 
Participants were asked to click on the object they had seen before. A tone provided 
feedback. For the other subset of participants (N = 24), only two options (2AFC) were 
presented side by side on the horizontal meridian (the center of each image was 7.9˚ away 
from fixation). One option was the target, while the other was the within-category foil. 
Participants were asked to click on the object they had seen before and a tone provided 
feedback. 
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Coding of the verbal descriptions. Three research assistants served as judges. As 
in Experiment 1, the judges were blind to the images that each participant saw. The 
coding procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. The judges were presented with each 
participant’s verbal description, along with the target object and a within-category foil. 
Judges had to identify the target object.  
 
Results 
1. Judges’ coding accuracy 
Judges’ accuracy in identifying the target objects was surprisingly low (Figure 
S4.2.). Mean accuracy was: judge 1 55.6% (S.E. = 1.4%), judge 2 58.3% (S.E. = 1.03%), 
and judge 3 57.4% (S.E. = 1.02%). As in Experiment 1, for each judge, accuracy across 
the 48 participants they coded fell within a narrow range. In addition, the three judges 
produced accuracies within 2.7% of each other. The mean for all judges was 57.1% (S.E. 
= 0.86%). The consistency across judges justified the pooling of data across all judges to 
provide an index of the utility of participants’ descriptions to others. 
We compared the judges’ accuracy for the 12 participants in Experiment 1, with 
judges’ accuracy for the 48 participants in Experiment 2. This revealed a significant 
difference, t(58) = 11.8, p < .001, suggesting that the utility of verbal descriptions 
substantially declined when it was based on memory rather than perception. The judges’ 
accuracy in Experiment 2 was above chance (50%), t(47) = 8.27, p < .001, suggesting the 
presence of some, though limited, utility of one’s memory descriptions to third parties.  
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2. Difference between judges’ accuracy and participants’ own identification 
Participants’ own identification exceeded the judges’ accuracy. Participants tested 
in the 2AFC recognition task essentially carried out the same task as the judges, except 
that their choice was based on their own memory rather than on the descriptions they 
provided. For the 50 objects they described, the 24 participants in the 2AFC recognition 
task had a mean accuracy of 67.7% (S.E. = 2.1%), significantly higher than the judges’ 
accuracy, 56.9% (S.E. = 1.3%), t(23) = 7.29, p < .001. Participants tested in the 4AFC 
task identified the correct category (either the target or the within-category foil) 88.1% 
(S.E. = 2.7%) of the time, suggesting good category memory. Among trials in which they 
identified the correct category, participants chose the target 70.4% (S.E. = 2.3%) of the 
time. This value was again significantly higher than the judges’ accuracy (M = 57.3%, 
S.E. = 1.2%), t(23) = 7.37, p < .001. The difference between participants’ own 
recognition accuracy and the judges’ identification accuracy indicates information loss 
when visual memory was transmitted to another person via verbal description. The loss 
could be due to a change in coding format (from visual to verbal) or to the failure of fully 
describing one’s visual memory. 
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3. Correspondence between judges’ accuracy and participants’ own identification 
Although judges performed worse than the participants, the pattern of behavior 
across images showed a clear correspondence between the two (Figure S4.3.). 
Figure S4.3. Judges’ mean accuracy binned by participants’ identification accuracy in 
Phase 3 (recognition memory test). Left: Results when participants were given the 4AFC 
task. Participants either committed a category error (i.e., choosing a between-category 
foil), an exemplar error (i.e., choosing a within-category foil), or chose the target and 
obtained a correct response. Right: Results when participants were given the 2AFC task. 
Error bars show ±1S.E. of the mean. 
 
When participants were given the 4AFC task in Phase 3 (Figure S4.3., left), 
judges were significantly above chance (M = 63.9%, S.E. = 2.0%) for images that 
participants themselves successfully identified later on, t(23) = 6.99, p < .001. Judges’ 
accuracy declined to significantly below chance (M = 38.7%, S.E. = 2.1%) for images 
that participants later chose the within-category foil, t(23) = 5.46, p < .001. This suggests 
that when participants were mistaken with regard to which exemplar they had seen, their 
earlier verbal description was more consistent with the foil, misleading the judges toward 
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choosing the foil more often than the target. Finally, for images that participants later 
chose a between-category foil, judges’ accuracy was above chance (M = 62.7%, S.E. = 
4.7%), t(19) = 2.72, p = .0131. 
Correspondence between the participants’ own identification and the judges’ 
choices was also observed in participants who completed the 2AFC task in Phase 3 
(Figure S4.3., right). Here, judges performed significantly above chance (M = 66%, S.E. 
= 1.3%) when participants later chose the target, t(23) = 11.78, p < .001, and performed 
significantly below chance (M = 37%, S.E. = 1.6%) when participants later chose the 
within-category foil, t(23) = 7.93, p < .001. 
 
 
4. Good vs. bad descriptors, good vs. bad identifiers 
Figure S4.4. Scatterplots on the relationship between the judges’ accuracy and the 
participants’ own identification accuracy in Experiment 2. Each data point corresponds 
to a single participant.  
 
																																																								
1 The N was smaller for between-category foils because not every participant made between-category 
errors. 
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The correspondence examined above was across stimuli – we found that objects 
that participants correctly identified were also more accurately described, compared with 
objects that participants misidentified. Here we investigated the between-participant 
variability in description and identification. Each participant yielded an identification 
score – percent of the time that they chose the target rather than the within-category foil. 
Each participant also yielded a description score – percent of the time that the judges 
chose the target based on their verbal descriptions. Figure S4.4. plots the correlation 
between the two measures, for participants in the 4AFC task (Figure S4.4., left), 2AFC 
task (Figure S4.4., middle), and for all participants (Figure S4.4., right). We found a 
significant correlation between the two measures, with Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
of .65 in the 4AFC task (p = .001), .70 in the 2AFC task (p < .001), and .67 when all 
participants were considered (p < .001). Consistent with the previous meta-analysis 
(Meissner et al., 2008), participants who provided better descriptions were also better 
identifiers themselves. Information loss is also apparent in Figure S4.4. (right), where the 
main diagonal shows equivalent performance between the judges and the participants. 
Nearly all participants’ data lie above the diagonal line, meaning that participants’ own 
identification accuracy exceeds the judges’ accuracy.  
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 shows that when describing objects from memory, participants 
provide some, though highly limited, information to others. Judges can only discriminate 
the target object participants saw from a within-category exemplar 57% of the time. This 
level is about 30% lower than that observed in Experiment 1 in which descriptions were 
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based on perception rather than memory. Participants’ own identification accuracy 
exceeds the judges’, showing information loss when describing their visual memory. 
Thus, the judges’ poor identification accuracy can be attributed to participants’ memory 
inaccuracy, as well as to information loss when visual memory is transcribed into words.  
 This experiment also reveals strong correspondence between participants’ own 
identification accuracy and the utility of their descriptions. Participants who give better 
descriptions and therefore enable judges to reach higher accuracy, also themselves have 
higher identification accuracy. In addition, within a participant, objects receiving better 
descriptions are also ones that are more accurately identified by the participant. When 
participants choose the wrong exemplar, their earlier verbal description contains 
misinformation, resulting in judges’ tendency to choose the wrong exemplar more often 
than the target object.  
 The correspondence between the participants’ description accuracy and their 
identification accuracy appears to be stronger in the current study than in previous studies 
(e.g., Pigott & Brigham, 1985). This may be due to stimulus differences: faces may be so 
difficult to describe such that what is described has poor correspondence to the actual 
stimuli. Another difference is the way description accuracy is measured. Several previous 
studies measured description accuracy by rating the descriptions as “accurate”, 
“ambiguous”, or “inaccurate” (Wells, 1985). This classification may inflate the utility of 
the descriptions, given that an accurate but general description may not be useful, and a 
partly accurate description may be misleading. In addition, the ratings used in previous 
studies may lack reliability. In a pilot phase of our study, we asked raters to rate 
participants’ verbal descriptions by displaying the verbal descriptions along with the 
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actual object they saw. We found that the raters lacked confidence in rating the 
descriptions – many statements contained both correct and misleading information and 
could not be easily classified as “partly accurate” or “inaccurate.” Instead of forcing the 
raters to make their best bet on the classification, the current study uses a method that is 
unambiguous – judges are asked to identify the target object based on the participants’ 
verbal descriptions. This way, everything in the verbal descriptions becomes relevant, 
and the judges’ task is essentially the same as the participants’ identification task (Phase 
3). The low variability across judges indicates that this method is highly reliable. The 
strong correspondence between the participants’ identification accuracy and the utility of 
their descriptions provides support for one of the Supreme Court’s guidelines regarding 
the evaluation of identification evidence (Neil v. Biggers, 1972). Accurate earlier 
descriptions indeed have some correspondence to accurate subsequent identification, at 
least for visual memory of objects.  
 
Experiment 3 
 Recounting one’s memory can be fairly immediate, as in Experiment 2. Often 
times, however, there is a delay before we can provide a verbal description of what we 
saw. How does the utility of verbal reports change with time? The retrieval effort account 
(Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Carpenter, 2009) states that people remember what was 
encoded better if the time interval between the initial study and the first retrieval is 
longer. This suggests that delaying the first retrieval attempt makes the solution less 
accessible, necessitating an increase in retrieval effort on that attempt and enhancing 
one’s memory in subsequent tests. Along these lines, it is possible that a longer delay 
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between encoding and the verbal recall in our study would lead to a more effortful 
retrieval during verbal recall, yielding a verbal description that has greater utility to third 
parties (e.g., perhaps only the more diagnostic information is retained in that description). 
On the other hand, memory decays during delays, and this may decrease the verbal 
description utility to others. As shown in Experiment 2, verbal descriptions from memory 
are much less useful than those from perception, suggesting that as memory further 
decays, the utility of the verbal descriptions may decline further as well. Experiment 3 
tests these competing predictions by inserting a 24-hour delay between encoding and the 
verbal description phase.  
 
Method 
 Participants. Forty-five participants, 33 females and 12 males, completed the 
study. Their mean age was 19 years. 
 Design and Procedure. Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2, except that a 
delay of 24 hours was inserted between Phases 1 and 2. Participants encoded 150 
photographs on Day 1. They returned 24 hours later and completed a verbal description 
of 50 objects in a similar manner as in Experiment 2. Immediately after the verbal 
description, participants completed the identification task using either the 4AFC (N=23) 
or the 2AFC task (N=22).  
 Coding of the verbal descriptions. Three research assistants served as judges in 
the coding phase. The procedure was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.  
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Results 
1. Judges’ coding accuracy 
Judges performed poorly based on participants’ verbal descriptions of the objects 
(Figure S4.2.). The mean accuracy was: judge 1 51.3% (S.E. = 0.97%), judge 2 51.5% 
(S.E. = 1.0%), and judge 3 52.7% (S.E. = 1.2%). As in the first two experiments, the 
judges produced highly similar levels of accuracy, with a mean of 51.8% and an S.E. of 
0.8%. The judges’ data were therefore averaged to produce an index of the utility of the 
participants’ verbal descriptions.  
Judges’ accuracy – 51.8% – was very low. It was statistically above chance, t(44) 
= 2.25, p = .03, but significantly lower than that observed in Experiment 2, t(91) = 4.46, p 
< .001, or Experiment 1, t(55) = 14.10, p < .001. Thus, following a 24-hour delay, the 
verbal descriptions were of little value to third parties.   
 
2. Difference between judges’ accuracy and participants’ own identification 
As in Experiment 2, the judges’ accuracy was lower than participants’ own 
identification accuracy. In Phase 3, for the 50 objects they described, participants tested 
in the 4AFC task rarely chose the wrong category (correct category was chosen 87.2% of 
the time, S.E. = 1.7%). Among trials in which the correct object category was chosen, 
participants chose the target object (as opposed to the within-category foil) 63.4% of the 
time (S.E. = 1.4%). This was significantly higher than the judges’ accuracy (M = 52.3%, 
S.E. = 1.4%), t(22) = 8.86, p < .001. Participants tested in the 2AFC task chose the target 
object 63% of the time (S.E. = 1.6%), again significantly higher than the judges’ accuracy 
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(M = 51.3%, S.E. = 0.87%), t(21) = 7.58, p < .001. Clearly, participants had access to 
information that was not part of their verbal descriptions.  
 
3. Correspondence between judges’ accuracy and participants’ own identification 
Even though the judges’ overall accuracy was close to chance, they did not 
perform randomly. Instead, their performance corresponded strongly with the 
participants’ performance. First, when participants were given the 4AFC task in Phase 3, 
judges were significantly above chance (M = 60%, S.E. = 2.2%) for images that 
participants themselves successfully identified later, t(22) = 4.57, p < .001. Judges’ 
accuracy declined to a level not different from chance (M = 47%, S.E. = 4.2%) when 
participants later chose a between-category foil, t(21) = 0.66, p = .522. Judges were 
significantly below chance (M = 41%. S.E. = 2.1%) when participants later chose the 
within-category foil instead of the target, t(22) = 4.18, p < .001. Similar results were 
found in participants who completed the 2AFC recognition task. For images that 
participants later accurately identified, the judges also performed above chance based on 
the participants’ descriptions (M = 59%, S.E. = 1.6%), t(21) = 5.83, p < .001. For images 
that participants later incorrectly identified, judges were also more likely to choose the 
within-category foil – the judges’ accuracy was 36% (S.E. = 2.0%), a level significantly 
below chance, t(21) = 6.78, p < .001. These data confirm once again that participants’ 
verbal descriptions contained both accurate and misleading information and that this 
information was the common source of errors for both the participants themselves and for 
the judges.  																																																								
2 The degrees of freedom was 21 rather than 22 because one participant did not commit any between-
category errors. 
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4. Good vs. bad descriptors, good vs. bad identifiers 
Figure S4.5. Scatterplots on the relationship between the judges’ accuracy and the 
participants’ own identification accuracy in Experiment 3. Each data point corresponds 
to a single participant.  
 
As in Experiment 2, for each participant, we computed their average identification 
accuracy and the judges’ accuracy based on their descriptions (Figure S4.5.). The results 
suggest that good descriptors also tended to be good identifiers. For participants who 
completed the 4AFC task (Figure S4.5., left), Pearson’s correlation between the 
participants’ and the judges’ accuracy was .48, p = .02. The correlation failed to reach 
significance in participants who completed the 2AFC task (Figure S4.5., middle), 
Pearson’s r = 0.37, p = .09. When all participants were combined (Figure S4.5., right), 
the correlation was r = 0.43, p = .004. These correlations were lower than in Experiment 
2, possibly due to near-floor performance of the judges, restricting the range of data and 
lowering the correlations.   
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Discussion 
 With a 24-hour delay before verbal recall, the utility of verbal reports decreases to 
a level near chance. This finding suggests that time delay causes memory for the visual 
stimuli to decay such that people are less able to provide useful verbal descriptions for 
third parties. Even though people are suggested to have excellent memories for the visual 
details of common objects (Brady et al., 2008), this memory does not necessarily 
translate to useful descriptions for third parties’ use, as compared to when the objects are 
described from perception.  
 Despite very low utility for third parties, Experiment 3 again confirmed strong 
correspondence between participants’ identification based on their visual memory, and 
the judges’ choices based on participants’ verbal descriptions. When participants were 
correct in identification, their earlier verbal descriptions contained sufficiently accurate 
information for the judges to perform above chance. When participants were incorrect in 
identification, their earlier reports contained inaccurate information that misled the judges 
toward choosing the wrong object. This finding suggests that verbal recall and visual 
identification share common memory sources (Meissner, 2002).  
 
General Discussion 
 In this study we examined how useful verbal reports of objects are for third 
parties. We found that when verbal descriptions are constructed from perception, people 
are able to provide very useful descriptions. However, when verbal descriptions are 
provided from memory, utility of the descriptions drops drastically. Minutes after the 
initial memory encoding, the verbal descriptions enable judges to choose the target object 
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with just 57% accuracy, where chance is 50%. Twenty-four hours later, the utility 
declines to 51.8%, a level just barely above chance. The participants’ ability to produce a 
significantly more useful verbal report of the objects from perception compared to 
memory suggests that the low verbal report utility is largely due to memory limitations, 
rather than poor verbal descriptive ability overall.  
 The contrast between perception and memory sheds light on the debate between 
two camps of thought on visual memory. One camp states that people have highly 
impressive visual long-term memory. For example, Standing, Conezio, and Haber (1970) 
showed that people can recognize more than 90% of photographs presented a day earlier, 
even though they initially saw each of several thousand photographs for just 10s. Brady 
et al. (2008) found that people have accurate memory about the state and exemplar of 
several thousand visual objects they viewed for just 3s each. They estimate that visual 
long-term memory can hold 217.8 bits of unique information. In contrast, others propose 
that instead of representing visual details in memory, people rely on the external world as 
their “memory” (O’Regan & Noe, 2001), and visual details are lost as soon as they are no 
longer in view (Levin & Simons, 1997). In a virtual reality block-construction task, 
Ballard, Hayhoe, and Pelz (1995) found that people tend to code just one piece of 
information (e.g., the color of a block) at a time, and frequently make repeated fixations 
on the same object to extract additional information (e.g., the shape of a block). So, does 
visual memory have high capacity or is it sparse? There is no doubt these contrasting 
views can both be correct under different circumstances. The question is, which view 
more accurately captures performance in specific situations? Our study shows that when 
it comes to the transmission of visual information from one person to another, memory is 
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a highly unreliable source. The idealized, high-capacity visual memory people are able to 
achieve (Brady et al., 2008) does not lend itself to a useful verbal report for others. When 
allowed to look at the visual stimulus itself, however, people do notice details and are 
able to describe them to produce a useful report for third parties.  
 Although memory is a significant source of inaccuracies found in this study, we 
also have some evidence that information is lost when people translate visual codes to 
verbal codes. In Experiment 1 when participants described objects from perception, 
judges were able to identify the target object at 87%, a level significantly below perfect. 
In Experiments 2 and 3 when participants described objects from memory, the judges’ 
accuracy was significantly below the participants’ own identification accuracy. This loss 
of information may be due to a variety of reasons. Part of the information loss may stem 
from a mismatch between the non-linguistic processing that the recognition task involves 
and the linguistic verbal processing that the recall task involves (Pozzulo et al., 2007). 
Additionally, with perception-based descriptions, participants could rely on the picture to 
cue them to features that could be included in their descriptions. With memory-based 
descriptions however, a less precise representation of the object, which fades with time, 
may make the translation more difficult. Finally, because participants had no prior 
knowledge of the nature of the foils, they could not tune their encoding and descriptions 
to the diagnostic aspects of the objects. This means that even if they had access to 
diagnostic features, they may not have included that information in the verbal 
descriptions. For these reasons, people are likely to have difficulty representing the full 
extent of their visual memory in verbal reports.  
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 Even so, it is clear that some information is still transmitted to the judges. In both 
Experiments 2 and 3, there was a systematic pattern in the judges’ performance which 
aligned with how participants themselves performed in the final memory test. Judges 
performed better (i.e., participants’ verbal descriptions were more useful) when 
participants themselves recognized those objects later on. Conversely, when participants 
later chose the within-category foil, the verbal descriptions they provided for those 
objects also misled judges to choose the within-category foil more often than the target. 
These findings show that verbal descriptions can contain useful, as well as misleading, 
information for third parties, and that the misinformation was a source of the judges’ 
inaccurate choices. Unfortunately, the misinformation may also have been a source of the 
participants’ own mistakes. When participants attempted to recall the objects in Phase 2, 
they may have had inaccurate memories to begin with, leading to incorrect recognition in 
Phase 3. Even if their memory did not contain misleading information prior to recall, the 
act of recalling the objects may have introduced misinformation (Brainerd & Reyna, 
1998a; Reyna, 1995), which could then get incorporated into memory through 
reconsolidation (Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009). In this study, objects included in 
Phase 2 may be associated with worse memory than objects omitted from verbal recall, 
and there is some evidence that this is the case (Tan & Jiang, 2018).  
 Although recall and recognition may rely on different sources of information 
(Pozzulo et al., 2007), the strong correspondence between the participants’ identification 
and the judges’ choice suggests that they do share common sources. This finding is 
consistent with previous meta-analysis on eyewitness testimony (Meissner et al., 2008). 
The correlation observed in our study appears to be stronger than what was found in the 
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past. This may be due to the use of objects, which are more verbalizable, rather than faces 
in the present study, and the similarity between the judges’ task and the participants’. 
Instead of asking the judges to rate the participants’ verbal descriptions as accurate or 
inaccurate, our study design involved the same identification task for the judges and the 
participants, changing only the basis of the identification (i.e., someone else’s verbal 
description vs. one’s own experience). Our study supports the Supreme Court’s 
guidelines with regards to evaluating identification evidence (Neil v. Biggers, 1972): 
better prior description of crime details does correspond to more accurate identification 
subsequently.  
 Intuitively, both the reduction in information from perception to memory and the 
loss of information from visual to verbal codes are expected. Nevertheless, it is surprising 
that these factors together nearly abolish the utility of one’s verbal descriptions to others. 
Even for a type of stimuli that is somewhat verbalizable and associated with high 
memory capacity, the judges’ identification accuracy was close to chance after just 
minutes (or 24 hours) of delay. This finding presents strong constraints to the utility of 
one’s visual memory. As we gain ready access to other people’s knowledge, via text 
messaging or other social media, there is no guarantee that the expansion of cognition 
from one’s own brain to the external world would bring the type of gains we would like 
to have. The unreliability of information transmission from one person to another 
suggests, instead, that such transmission can be a major source of errors, a hotbed for 
“fake news.” This is not to say that accurate information cannot be transmitted. Though 
visual memory for exemplars within a category may not be accurately transmitted, visual 
memory for categorical information may be better preserved. In addition, conditions that 
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improve the initial memory, such as increased encoding duration, repetition, and a 
reduction in the number of objects encoded, may all be beneficial. Nonetheless, the 
situation presented here – brief exposure to multiple objects and immediate or delayed 
recall – is typical of daily experience, including eyewitness situations.  
 Our findings suggest that in real-world situations that resemble the current study, 
it would be more beneficial to depend on surveillance images or video records rather than 
witnesses’ verbal descriptions when trying to decipher the visual details of what was seen 
previously. The low level of accuracy observed in this study is dangerous in higher stakes 
situations, such as during the identification of a critical object used in a crime. Our study 
only presented two choices, while in reality, an infinite number of possibilities for an 
object often exist, likely lowering “judges’” accuracy further. The strong correspondence 
between the judges’ choice and the participants’ own identification, even in cases when 
both were wrong, suggests that internal consistency is no proof for accuracy. Unless 
corroborated by additional sources, such internal consistency may further misguide 
investigations, allowing inaccurate information to perpetuate through multiple channels. 
In cases where surveillance records are unavailable, a more non-linguistic task, such as 
pointing out and describing similarities and differences (Brown & Lloyd-Jones, 2005) 
between the person’s memory and another exemplar presented visually, rather than a pure 
verbal report task, should be used to uncover people’s visual memories. Relying solely on 
verbal reports likely prevents significant portions of a person’s visual memory from being 
transmitted to third parties, as observed from the discrepancy between the judges’ 
accuracy and the participants’ own identification accuracy.  
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 The advancement of technologies, including search engines and social media, has 
significantly changed the way people access information. Because the external world 
often functions as an extension of one’s own cognition (O’Regan & Noë, 2001), as our 
access to the external world changes, it also profoundly affects how we function. Instead 
of remembering essential information, for instance, people now tend to remember where 
to find it (Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011). As people gain instant access to others’ 
knowledge through social media and other apps, we become increasingly reliant on 
others to guide our actions, plans, and understanding. In this study, we show that there 
are constraints on the reliability and utility of others’ knowledge to us. Other people’s 
visual memories, in particular, may be useless or even misleading, after just a day of 
delay. This limitation underscores the importance of more reliable sources of 
information, and may help us understand the perpetuation of misinformation in the 
modern world.  
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5. Summary and implications 
The goal of this dissertation was to examine the consequences of recounting a 
memory for both the describer and the listener. To this end, three sets of experiments 
were conducted, two of which investigated the effects of recounting on a describer’s 
subsequent memory, and one of which examined the utility of that recounting for third 
parties. In this final section, I will summarize the findings from the studies done and 
discuss their implications for both the scientific field and for society.  
 
5.1. The effects of recounting on visual memory 
5.1.1. How recounting affects visual exemplar memory - findings 
This first study examined the effects of intervening recall on visual exemplar (i.e., 
detail) memory for common objects. Participants were shown photographs of common 
objects one at a time, and then asked to verbally recall a subset of them. In a final 
memory test, recognition memory for all the objects was tested. We found that 
intervening recall had multiple effects on visual memory, showing that recounting 
introduces interference in the short term, but produces a net positive effect on visual 
memory in the long term. Intervening recall slowed forgetting of the materials such that 
after a 24-hour delay following intervening recall, photographs that were recalled were 
better remembered than those that were not recalled. 
 
5.1.2. The effects of recounting across memory attributes - findings 
 In the second study, I extended the investigation of how generalizable the effects 
of recounting a memory are on subsequent memory performance. Specifically, I ask 
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whether the effects of recounting generalize across different attributes of memory – 
namely, item and source memory. Participants were shown photographs of common 
objects superimposed onto scenes. In a subsequent intervening recall phase, they were 
shown a subset of the scenes and asked to verbally recall all the objects that were 
previously presented on that scene. This task required that both the objects and their 
corresponding scene be recalled. Hence, retrieval effort was needed for both item and 
source memory during this intervening phase. In a final memory test 24 hours later, 
participants’ memory for either the objects (item) or the scenes (source) were tested. The 
item exemplar memory facilitation previously observed from intervening recall in Section 
2 was extended to source memory. No memory enhancement from recounting was 
observed for item exemplar memory in this second study, although this could have been 
due to the presence of a ceiling effect. Analysis of the participants’ verbal descriptions 
suggested that the intervening recall benefits were related to how much fruitful retrieval 
occurred during recall, lending support to the retrieval effort account (Carpenter & 
DeLosh, 2006) of the testing effect. Whether a causal relationship between the amount of 
retrieval and subsequent memory performance exists should be examined by future 
studies. 
 
5.1.3. Significance of the findings 
5.1.3.1. Evidence for verbal overshadowing and spontaneous misinformation 
 The findings from the first two studies shed light on several controversial theories 
surrounding the effects of recounting, the first of which is verbal overshadowing 
(Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). The verbal overshadowing effect is said to occur 
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because of transfer inappropriate retrieval (Schooler, Fiore, & Brandimonte, 1997). A 
visual stimulus (often a perpetrator’s face) contains both verbalizable and less 
verbalizable components. By attempting to verbally describe the face, the process 
overshadows the components that the witness is not able to verbalize. This suppression 
then leads to increased difficulty while trying to match the now description-based 
memory of the face to the visual stimuli presented during the recognition task.  
Particularly in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, after the effect was first reported 
(Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990), the verbal overshadowing effect was argued to 
either be difficult to replicate (Yu & Geiselman, 1993) or smaller than had originally 
been reported (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). These findings raised doubts about whether 
the phenomenon existed at all. Given the variation in methods used across studies, a 
large-scale replication of the original Schooler & Engstler-Schooler (1990) study was 
done (Alogna et al., 2014). It was found that the effect largely depended on when the 
tasks (i.e., witnessing of the event, describing the event, and performing the recognition 
task after describing) were performed relative to each other. The verbal overshadowing 
effect was larger when a delay was introduced after the event was witnessed and before 
the verbal description was provided. The suggestion that the timing of the tasks affects 
the magnitude of the effect is also supported by the results from a meta-analysis 
(Meissner & Brigham, 2001), which found that the verbal overshadowing effect was 
evident when the final recognition task occurred immediately after the verbal description 
was provided. When a delay was inserted between the verbal description task and the 
final recognition task, however, the verbal overshadowing effect disappeared. This may 
have been due to a ‘release’ of the interference from verbalization over the delay.  
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The results in Section 2 align with these findings and suggest that the verbal 
overshadowing effect can indeed be observed and does exist, given the “right” 
conditions. Schooler et al. (1997) suggest that it is the suppression of the less verbalizable 
components of memory, from verbalization, that leads to memory performance 
impairment. In Section 2, where category memory and exemplar memory were separately 
analyzed, exemplar memory was, by definition, the less verbalizable component of 
participants’ memories, and thus should have been most adversely affected by verbal 
recall. Indeed, that was the case. When final memory testing occurred immediately after 
intervening recall, an interference effect was observed only for exemplar memory. 
However, once a delay was inserted between intervening recall and final memory test, the 
impairment was no longer observed, similar to that found in past studies (Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001). In fact, a net positive effect emerged. Further evidence of the verbal 
overshadowing effect comes from the data observed in Section 2 Experiment 2, where 
asking participants to describe (and not just visualize) the object during intervening recall 
led to the largest impairment in exemplar memory. These findings suggest that the act of 
verbalizing one’s memory for the visual objects does play a role in the interference effect 
that was observed in experiments where the final memory test occurred immediately after 
intervening recall. The findings in Section 2, therefore, strengthen the idea that the verbal 
overshadowing effect can be one reason why intervening recall leads to subsequent 
memory impairment. 
 Another way in which memory can be interfered with is through reactivation and 
reconsolidation (Dudai, 2004; Diekelmann et al., 2011; Schiller et al., 2010). Whether or 
not the memory interference observed in past research is actually due to reconsolidation 
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effects, however, is still debated (Elsey et al., 2018). What is clear is that memory can be 
interfered with when retrieved. Studies that have examined the role of reconsolidation in 
memory interference have typically involved experimenter-induced misinformation 
where the experimenter observes whether the misinformation they provide gets 
incorporated into and interferes with the participants’ original memory (e.g., Chan & 
LaPaglia, 2013; Chan et al., 2009; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). In 
one study (Chan & LaPaglia, 2013), participants were asked to watch an episode of a TV 
show. Afterwards, their memories were either reactivated or not before being presented 
with misinformation about the episode. In a subsequent recognition test, participants were 
impaired in their ability to recognize accurate information about the episode only if they 
were in the reactivation group. The studies in this dissertation show, however, that the 
interference from misinformation is more widespread than a third party attempting to 
introduce false information into one’s memory. Misinformation can be produced by the 
participants themselves. In Section 2 Experiment 1, participants’ exemplar recognition 
memory was impaired for objects that were included in the preceding intervening recall 
phase, suggesting that misinformation was spontaneously introduced during verbal recall, 
leading to its incorporation into memory. This then resulted in worse recognition memory 
performance for exemplar memory in the final recognition phase. While some may argue 
that the memory impairment on exemplar memory could be explained without 
misinformation, Section 4’s results show clear evidence that misinformation was 
included in verbal recall, ultimately leading to both judges and participants being more 
likely to select the within-category foil over the target in a 2AFC task. Rather than simply 
being uninformative, the verbal descriptions were misleading. 
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All in all, our findings highlight that misinformation can affect memory without 
the experimenter needing to introduce the misinformation. With a simple testing 
procedure where participants are asked to recall what they had seen before, 
misinformation can be introduced by the participants themselves, subsequently impairing 
memory performance. This vulnerable nature of people’s memories, where 
misinformation is spontaneously introduced by people during memory retrieval, had 
mainly been found in children (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998a; Reyna, 1995). To the best of 
our knowledge, our studies are some of the first few showing that spontaneous 
introduction of misinformation can also occur in adults. 
 
5.1.3.2. Dual effects of recounting 
Our studies also present the first evidence of a dual effect of recounting on 
memory. Research on how recounting affects memory has typically either reported a 
testing effect (i.e., benefit) from intervening retrieval (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006) 
or interference from recounting (e.g., Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Chan et al., 
2009). Our study shows that recounting can have multiple effects on visual memory, and 
that the relative strength of these effects changes across time. Section 2, for instance, 
shows that recounting leads to a net negative effect in the short term, while leading to a 
net positive effect in the long term with the inclusion of a delay after recounting. In other 
words, how intervening recounting affects subsequent memory depends on the relative 
strength of the opposing effects. These results present the clearest indication of 
recounting having multiple effects on memory. The data also confirm what has been 
observed in the testing effect literature, specifically supporting the idea that recounting 
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benefits memory by slowing down forgetting (retrieval effort account; Carpenter & 
DeLosh, 2006). Because the benefit to memory is from slowed forgetting, it is no surprise 
that a net positive effect from recounting is only observed with a delay after intervening 
recall, once forgetting of the not-recalled material has occurred. 
 
5.1.3.3. Visual memory processes 
Besides shedding light on the dynamic nature of intervening retrieval’s effects on 
visual memory, our experimental design also allows for the separate examination of how 
intervening retrieval affects category versus detail visual memory. In doing so, our data 
uncover specific processes underlying visual memory. Category information was never 
impaired by intervening recall (Sections 2 and 3), suggesting that category memory is 
less vulnerable to the detrimental effects of verbal re-coding and misinformation, an idea 
that aligns with past findings. Past studies found memory enhancement from intervening 
retrieval when memory was tested in a coarser manner and at the more verbalizable level 
(e.g., Carpenter & Pashler, 2007). The details of visual memory, however, may be more 
susceptible to impairments from verbalization, particularly in the short term (Section 2). 
The greater difficulty of remembering details compared to category information, 
especially over time (Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008), suggests that detail visual memory 
may be more susceptible to inaccuracies, leading to impaired memory performance later 
on via reactivation and reconsolidation effects, for instance. The attempt to verbalize a 
more visual component of visual memory (i.e., the details) may also have interfered with 
memory through verbal overshadowing, affecting subsequent memory performance in the 
short term. 
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5.2. Usefulness of verbal descriptions for others 
5.2.1. Findings 
In Section 4, the utility of one’s verbal descriptions of visual objects to others was 
examined. Participants either had to describe objects from perception (i.e., while looking 
at the object) or from memory so that someone else (i.e., the judges) could identify the 
object they saw based on their descriptions. When objects were described from 
perception, participants were able to provide fairly useful descriptions to judges, with 
judges identifying the target objects about 87% of the time. However, judges’ accuracy 
dropped drastically to near chance levels when participants described the objects from 
memory. Analysis of the participants’ own recognition accuracy revealed that the 
usefulness of their verbal descriptions heavily depended on whether the participants 
themselves had good memories for the objects. When participants’ memories were good, 
leading to accurate responses during the recognition test, their prior descriptions also led 
judges to perform better for those objects. When they made recognition errors, however, 
their descriptions also misled judges to make errors. Furthermore, participants who had 
better recognition accuracy overall tended to provide the judges with better descriptions, 
leading to higher judges’ accuracy. This correspondence between the participants’ 
recognition accuracy and the usefulness of the verbal descriptions they provided suggests 
that verbal recall and visual identification may share common memory sources. 
 
5.2.2. Significance of the findings 
 The findings grant insight into an important point regarding verbal reports, which 
is that some information is lost during one’s translation of their visual representations 
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into verbal reports. When describing from perception, one might predict that judges’ 
accuracy would be close to or at 100%, since memory is not a limiting factor during 
description. However, judges performed at 87% accuracy, significantly below perfect 
performance. This finding suggests that participants may have limited descriptive ability 
overall. In addition, a more obvious reason for the difference between judges’ and 
participants’ accuracy is that participants did not know what the foils were going to be. 
As a result, they were not aware of which features of the object were diagnostic, and 
therefore, important to describe. In the real world, it is not uncommon to be unaware of 
what the foils are when describing what was seen to someone else. As such, the findings 
in this study show a possible limitation of one’s ability to describe an object well for 
someone else in the real world. These limitations also played out when participants were 
describing the objects from memory. When participants’ memories for the objects were 
good so that they correctly chose the target later on, their own recognition accuracy was 
still significantly higher than the judges’ accuracy. These results, therefore, also suggest 
that participants have more information about the target in their memories than they are 
able to verbally describe.  
The presence and role of misinformation are also highlighted in Section 4’s 
findings. While it is possible that when participants’ memories were poor, they simply 
did not provide enough information for judges to perform well, there is evidence that 
misinformation was indeed provided during recounting in some situations. When 
participants later chose a between-category foil, their prior verbal descriptions led judges 
to perform at chance, particularly when the verbal descriptions were provided 24 hours 
after the objects were seen (Section 4 Experiment 3). In this case, their verbal 
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descriptions may have lacked useful information and been too sparse for judges to decide 
between the target and within-category foil. When participants later chose the within-
category foil, however, their prior verbal descriptions for those objects led judges to 
perform significantly below chance. In other words, the verbal descriptions were not just 
unhelpful – they were misleading. These results suggest that misinformation was 
included in those descriptions, eventually leading judges to choose the within-category 
foil more often than the target, and possibly also affecting the participants’ own 
subsequent recognition accuracy by interfering with memory. These results highlight a 
critical implication for the real world, particularly in criminal investigations. When 
participants were more likely to choose the within-category foil, they also misled judges 
to do the same. In other words, internal consistency between the participants’ (or 
witness’) and judges’ accuracies does not imply that the choice made was accurate. 
 The results in Section 4 also have theoretical implications for memory more 
broadly. Past research has shown a poor correspondence between recall and recognition 
(Pozzulo et al., 2007), suggesting that recall and recognition may rely on different 
sources of memory. This argument is problematic for a U.S. Supreme Court guideline 
(Neil v. Biggers, 1972) for evaluating identification evidence, which states that a more 
accurate prior description should suggest that a subsequent identification made by a 
witness is also more reliable. In Section 4, where the verbal description task was a recall 
task (Experiments 2 and 3) and the subsequent identification task was a recognition task, 
a correspondence between the participants’ recognition accuracy and the usefulness of 
their prior verbal descriptions was found. Participants who had better recognition 
accuracy overall also gave better descriptions to judges. In addition, for any given 
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participant, if they later accurately identified an object, they also gave a better description 
for that object to judges. These findings lend support to the argument that verbal recall 
and visual identification may in fact rely on similar sources of memory. This also 
suggests that participants’ subsequent identification accuracy is predictive of how useful 
their prior descriptions will be for others, supporting the guideline from the U.S. Supreme 
Court. One reason why our results may differ from past findings (Pozzulo et al., 2007) 
could be due to the type of stimuli used in our study (i.e., objects) versus their study (i.e., 
faces). Objects are more verbalizable than faces, increasing the likelihood that a more 
linguistic task such as recall and an arguably more visual task, recognition, would still tap 
into common memory sources. To gain deeper insight into the reason behind this 
discrepancy, future research should specifically examine how the correspondence 
between recall and recognition differs for different types of stimuli. Based on the current 
findings, however, it seems that in deciding how predictive memory performance in one 
task is for another memory task, people need to look carefully at the type of stimuli the 
person is asked to remember. 
 Overall, the data from Section 4 paint a grim picture of how well people can 
actually convey information about what they have seen to others. But how much can we 
generalize these findings? Are there situations where utility of verbal reports would be 
higher than that reported here? The usefulness of verbal reports may, first of all, be 
higher for categorical information. Categorical information of what was seen is 
commonly provided by people before the more detailed information. This, in addition to 
the more diagnostic nature of categorical information, likely increases the usefulness of 
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verbal reports for identifying the right categories of objects that were seen by the 
describer.  
Another situation in which verbal report utility may be higher than what was 
found in Section 4 is in the case of more familiar third parties and situations. In our study, 
participants were presented with individual, generic, objects and were told to describe 
them for someone else. They were not aware of who the third party was going to be. 
Judges, likewise, were not aware of who the participants were. Therefore, they had to 
base their decisions entirely on the participants’ verbal descriptions and nothing else. In 
the real world, however, there are many cases when the person we are speaking to and 
providing the description for is familiar to us, such as a family member. The context in 
which an object is seen may also be familiar (e.g., a grocery store that one’s family 
frequents). In these cases, we are likely able to tap into shared knowledge between 
ourselves and that family member, highlighting what we know to be diagnostic features 
of the object we are describing. In some cases, we may even be able to simply state a 
label or name of a product and the family member will know exactly which item to get 
while grocery shopping. This prediction is supported by past work on the phenomenon of 
common ground, which shows that the more shared knowledge people have, the fewer 
words they need to communicate with each other and direct the other person to a specific 
picture they are referring to in a matching task, for example (e.g., Krauss & Weinheimer, 
1966; Isaacs & Clark, 1987). Hence, in these cases, it is likely that the utility of verbal 
descriptions, even those from memory, are much higher than is reported in Section 4. 
Having said this, cases similar to what is depicted in Section 4 are not uncommon 
either. When providing directions to a stranger, or to a family member in a foreign place, 
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or even in higher stakes situations such as after witnessing a crime, we are often called to 
describe what was seen from memory to another person who does not possess shared 
knowledge of the environment and the objects in it. In these cases, the utility of verbal 
descriptions may be lower than that reported in Section 4. In the absence of product 
labels, needing to describe things that are less verbalizable than common objects (e.g., 
faces), and not knowing what the “foils” would be, of which there may certainly be more 
than one, utility of one’s verbal descriptions likely lowers even further than that observed 
in Section 4. This would then lead to at or below chance performance of “judges” in the 
real world. Our results, therefore, highlight the importance of relying on surveillance 
records rather than verbal reports whenever possible, since the utility of verbal reports 
can be low and may even be misleading. Even a mere 24 hours after encoding, verbal 
descriptions become almost useless to third parties (Section 4 Experiment 3).  
The idea of surveillance may lead some to argue that with the prevalence of 
smartphones, people can take pictures and videos rather than verbally describe what they 
saw to someone else, effectively decreasing the need to be worried about the low utility 
that verbal reports have for third parties. With the increasing number of smartphones, 
however, people have increased access to social media, email, and applications that still 
involve describing what one has seen. When police are trying to locate a perpetrator, for 
instance, they often post a description of the person, based on what the eyewitness had 
told them. The public is then asked to use this description to locate the perpetrator. Easy 
access to the internet via smartphones means that the verbal description of the person is 
able to reach more people in a shorter amount of time than ever before. The speed at 
which information is transmitted to the wider public with the rise of smartphones is also 
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astounding. While one might expect that a short delay between witnessing a crime and 
posting a description would result in an accurate description, our study shows that even 
after a 2-minute delay, verbal descriptions can drop drastically in utility and even be 
misleading. If we are able to increase our awareness of the limitations of verbal 
descriptions in cases such as these, we can work towards reducing the number of false 
convictions that result from faulty eyewitness testimony. 
Might there be a way for us to be trained to become expert describers? Without 
the aid of visuals for the listener, sports commentators, for instance, have to describe the 
game they are watching over the radio. Their expert ability to describe the key moments 
of a game in real time raises the possibility that providing a useful description of what 
one saw, or is seeing, is possible. Before categorizing these commentators as expert 
describers, however, it is important to more closely examine the situations they are 
typically in. Several aspects of those situations make verbally describing a game easier 
than that presented in Section 4. Firstly, commentators are able to describe from 
perception (i.e., while seeing the game). Memory is rarely a limitation, unless the 
commentary occurs after a game. Even then, playback videos are usually available. As 
seen from Section 4, removing the limitation of memory can greatly increase the 
usefulness of one’s verbal description for third parties. Secondly, the audience (i.e., the 
third parties) often have shared knowledge with the commentator about the layout of the 
field, the markings important to the game, and the roles that the players have on a team. 
These, in addition to having verbalizable labels such as jersey numbers, players’ names, 
and field markings (e.g., “the 50 mark”), lead to an increased ease of describing a game 
for a radio listener. In these situations, it is uncommon to need to describe unmarked, 
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generic objects or persons, since those are unlikely to be important to the game. If sports 
commentators are placed in a situation where they have to be eyewitnesses instead, it is 
unclear whether they will be able to provide verbal descriptions of the perpetrator and the 
objects present at a scene more effectively than the general public. 
The strikingly low utility of verbal descriptions in the situation presented in 
Section 4, where there is brief exposure to multiple objects and immediate or delayed 
recall, begs the question of whether there are ways to improve third party accuracy from 
near chance to at least 87% (the accuracy of judges when verbal descriptions were 
provided from perception, Section 4 Experiment 1). Past work (Christie & Ellis, 1981) 
which found fairly good judges’ accuracy from verbal descriptions points to a couple of 
possible ways to improve verbal report utility. Participants were first shown a target face 
for 60s before being asked to verbally describe the face. If they missed out on one of the 
main features of the face in their description (hair/eyes/nose/lips/chin), the experimenter 
prompted them to provide information for that feature. Judges subsequently used these 
participants’ descriptions to select the target face from a lineup. Judges were able to 
identify about half of all the target faces. As such, it is possible that a longer encoding 
time for describers would increase the utility of the verbal descriptions for third parties. It 
should be noted, however, that the time one has to encode a visual stimulus is not always 
within their control. Furthermore, even with a prolonged viewing time of a visual 
stimulus, people have been found to make grave errors during identification (“Innocence 
Project”, n.d.). As such, the reliability and usefulness of a verbal description should not 
be assumed just because encoding time was long. The effectiveness of extended encoding 
times is likely modulated by how describable and easily remembered the visual stimulus 
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is. Another way in which the procedure in Christie and Ellis (1981) differed from ours is 
by prompting participants for specific feature descriptions. Doing this during the 
collection of verbal reports may therefore increase the utility of verbal descriptions for 
others. Having said this, precautions should also be taken with this intervention. One 
should be careful about the possibility of describers churning out misinformation in an 
effort to provide descriptions for all the key features of what was seen. As shown in 
Section 4, misinformation can not only mislead judges to make errors, it may lead to 
memory interference for the describers themselves, resulting in worse subsequent 
recognition accuracy. 
The continued examination of the utility of verbal reports, beyond what is 
reported in this dissertation, is important to expand the field’s understanding of the nature 
of memory, but also develop ways in which utility can be increased for third parties, 
especially in higher stakes situations like during eyewitness testimony. 
 
5.3. Delay between encoding and intervening recall 
 In Sections 2 and 3, the testing benefit from intervening recall clearly emerged 
when there was a 24-hour delay between intervening recall and final recognition testing. 
These results align with past findings showing that the testing effect increases across a 
delay because intervening retrieval slows forgetting of the material, supporting the 
retrieval effort account (Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006). Another prediction of the retrieval 
effort account is that the benefit from testing increases with retrieval effort on the 
intervening test. One way in which studies involving verbal materials (Karpicke & 
Roediger, 2007; Whitten & Bjork, 1977; Glover, 1989; Cuddy & Jacoby, 1982) have 
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demonstrated this effect is by inserting a delay between initial encoding and intervening 
retrieval. Delaying the first retrieval practice makes the solution less accessible, and 
hence increases retrieval effort on that first retrieval practice, enhancing performance in 
subsequent tests (Cuddy & Jacoby, 1982). Thus, by inserting a delay between encoding 
and intervening recall, the retrieval effort account predicts that the benefit derived from 
intervening recall will increase. 
 Having said this, retrieval benefits have typically been shown to depend on there 
being successful, fruitful retrieval of the material during the intervening test (Liu & 
Reder, 2016; Kornell et al., 2011; Rowland, 2014). As such, it is possible that introducing 
a delay between encoding and intervening retrieval will lead to enough memory decay so 
that retrieval during the intervening test will not reach a sufficient level of fruition. If so, 
subsequent memory performance could either show no benefits from intervening recall 
because people are not able to retrieve any useful information during intervening recall, 
or memory interference because misinformation is introduced during intervening recall. 
Data reported in this section are from an unpublished study where a 24-hour delay 
was inserted between Phase 1 (encoding) and Phase 2 (intervening recall) to examine 
these effects. 
 
5.3.1. Method 
 5.3.1.1. Participants. Twenty-four participants completed this study. There were 
19 females and 5 males, with a mean age of 19.3 years. 
 5.3.1.2. Design and procedure. This experiment was identical to that in Section 2 
Experiment 4A, except that the 24-hour delay occurred between the first (encoding) and 
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second (intervening recall) phases, rather than between the second and third (final 
memory test) phases. 
 
5.3.2. Results 
 As before, both the effect of intervening recall on category memory and exemplar 
memory were analyzed. The modulating effect of delay was also analyzed, with delay 
interval as a between-subject factor in subsequent analyses. 
 
 
Figure S5.1. Recognition category and exemplar memory results for objects included and 
not included in the intervening recall phase when there was a 24-hour memory delay 
between Phases 1 and 2. Error bars showed ±1S.E. of the mean. 
 
5.3.2.1. Immediate (Section 2, Experiment 1) vs. 24-hour delay between Phases 1 and 2 
(current experiment) 
 Category memory was enhanced for objects that were included in the intervening 
recall phase (Figure S5.1.). This enhancement was, however, stronger when there was a 
24-hour delay between Phase 1 and 2, compared to when all phases occurred on the same 
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day. An ANOVA with intervening recall as a within-subject factor and memory delay as 
a between-subject factor showed a significant main effect of intervening recall, F(1, 59) = 
305.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .84. Intervening recall increased category memory by 19.63% 
with a delay, compared to 12.37% without a delay. 
 The increased memory enhancement from the delay, however, was not observed 
with exemplar memory (Figure S5.1.). An ANOVA with intervening recall as a within-
subject factor and memory delay as a between-subject factor did not show any significant 
main effect or interaction, F(1, 59) = 2.82, p = .098. However, a comparison of exemplar 
memory performance for objects that were included (M = 63.02%, S.E. = 1.4) and not 
included in intervening recall (M = 62.31%, S.E. = 2.0) showed that performance was 
similar between the two conditions, t(23) = .035, p = .73, unlike that observed when all 
three phases occurred on the same day (Section 2, Experiment 1).  
 
5.3.2.2. 24-hour delay between Phases 1 and 2 (current experiment) vs. between Phases 2 
and 3 (Section 2, Experiment 4) 
 The effects of intervening recall on category memory and exemplar memory, 
when the 24-hour delay was inserted between Phase 1 (encoding) and Phase 2 
(intervening recall) or between Phase 2 and Phase 3 (final memory test), were compared. 
As observed when the 24-hour delay was inserted between Phase 2 (intervening recall) 
and Phase 3 (final memory test) in Section 2 Experiment 4, inserting a 24-hour delay 
between Phases 1 and 2 led to an enhancement of category memory for objects included 
in intervening recall compared to those that were not. An ANOVA with intervening recall 
(included and not included) as a within-subject factor and Experiment as a between-
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subject factor showed a significant main effect of intervening recall, F(1, 46) = 395.63, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .90. There was no interaction between intervening recall and Experiment, 
F(1, 46) = 2.47, p = .12. 
 The effects of intervening recall on exemplar memory, however, differed 
depending on when the 24-hour delay was introduced. Whereas a 24-hour delay between 
Phases 2 and 3 led to memory enhancement from intervening recall, a delay between 
Phases 1 and 2 in this experiment led to similar memory performance during the final 
memory test for objects that were included and not included in intervening recall. An 
ANOVA on intervening recall (included and not included) and Experiment revealed a 
significant main effect of intervening recall, F(1, 46) = 6.86, p = .012, ηp2 = .13, and a 
significant interaction, F(1, 46) = 4.26, p = .045, ηp2 = .085. Hence, intervening recall 
enhanced exemplar memory by about 6% when the 24-hour delay was between Phases 2 
and 3, but did not lead to any facilitation when the 24-hour delay was between Phases 1 
and 2. 
 
5.3.3. Discussion 
 Inserting a 24-hour delay between the encoding and intervening recall phases 
produced a pattern of results largely similar to that observed when the delay was between 
intervening recall and final memory test, but only for category memory. Intervening 
recall increased category memory when there was a delay introduced between Phases 1 
and 2, compared to when all three phases occurred on the same day. These results were 
predicted by the retrieval effort account, suggesting that intervening recall leads to a 
testing benefit because testing increases elaborative retrieval processing and thus, 
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accessibility to the material. As in Section 2, however, this increase in category memory 
from intervening recall may also have been due to the nature of the intervening recall test. 
The cue used in this experiment was a category cue, which re-exposed participants to the 
objects’ category name. As such, it is possible that the category memory facilitation was 
due to category information re-exposure rather than recall itself, or both. 
 Unlike for category memory, intervening recall did not significantly affect 
exemplar memory. Exemplar memory was not significantly different for objects that were 
included in intervening recall compared to those that were not included. This is in 
contrast to the condition where the 24-hour delay was inserted between Phases 2 and 3 
(Section 2 Experiment 4), which found an exemplar memory facilitation from intervening 
recall. The lack of exemplar memory facilitation in the current experiment is surprising, 
given the memory facilitation prediction from the verbal literature (Karpicke & Roediger, 
2007; Whitten & Bjork, 1977; Glover, 1989; Cuddy & Jacoby, 1982). One reason for this 
discrepancy could be the fact that memory decays over time. While the retrieval effort 
account predicts that a delay before intervening testing would lead to greater retrieval 
effort, and therefore, even greater memory enhancement from intervening testing, this 
facilitation has been found to depend on whether retrieval is successful (Liu & Reder, 
2016; Kornell et al., 2011; Rowland, 2014). In the current experiment, it is possible that 
memory for the object details decayed enough that during the intervening recall 24 hours 
later, participants were not able to recall enough information about the objects to 
strengthen the memory trace. This explanation aligns with what was found for category 
memory. The category memory enhancement from intervening recall was larger in the 
current study compared to when all three phases occurred on the same day. This is likely 
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due in part to the re-exposure to the category name, as well as the ease of remembering 
gist information compared to detailed information (Brainerd et al., 2008). When category 
information of the objects was retrieved, this strengthened category memory by a greater 
magnitude with a delay than without one. 
 Interestingly, an exemplar memory detriment was not observed in this current 
study, as was found in the same-day condition (Section 2 Experiment 1). A detrimental 
effect of intervening recall with a delay is partly predicted by the verbal overshadowing 
literature (Alogna et al., 2014, RRR2). Participants in their study watched a video of a 
robbery, completed a filler task for 20 minutes (i.e., had a delay), and then either wrote 
out a verbal description of the perpetrator or did another unrelated filler task. In a final 
recognition task immediately after the verbal description, participants had to pick out the 
perpetrator from a lineup. As in our study, the delay was inserted between encoding and 
verbal recall. Participants in the verbal overshadowing study were 16% less likely to 
select the target if they had completed the intervening verbal recall task than if they had 
not. Our study, however, did not show such a detrimental effect from intervening recall. 
Instead, it seems that recalling objects was as good as not having recalled them at all 
when there was a 24-hour delay between encoding and intervening recall test. The verbal 
overshadowing account suggests that verbalization suppresses harder to verbalize 
features. This then leads to worse performance in a subsequent recognition task, which 
depends in large part on remembering the less verbalizable, more visual, features of what 
was seen. It is possible, therefore, that after a 24-hour delay, memory was too poor for 
there to be “sufficient” visual memory to suppress. This and not being able to retrieve 
sufficient information for a fruitful retrieval are likely the reasons that intervening recall 
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had little effect on exemplar memory compared to the no-recall condition. All in all, it 
appears that a good balance between increasing retrieval effort, by increasing the 
difficulty of the intervening test, and having successful retrieval are necessary for testing 
benefits to emerge from intervening testing. Future research should modify the length of 
the delay to be shorter than 24 hours to see whether that would increase fruitful retrieval 
while still increasing retrieval difficulty enough to observe a testing benefit from 
intervening recall with the type of stimuli used in our study. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 The act of recounting one’s memory of what was seen is prevalent in daily life, 
making the investigation of how it can affect our own memories, and others’ actions, 
essential. This dissertation reveals the dynamic nature of memory, suggesting that the 
way in which recounting affects our memories varies and depends on a number of 
specific factors. The effect of recounting depends on the type of memory (category or 
exemplar, item or source) one is considering, whether a delay is involved, when the delay 
occurs, and the type of stimuli one is recounting, to name a few. Mechanistically, the 
success and amount of retrieval effort exerted during recounting can significantly 
determine the extent to which recounting results in a memory facilitation or impairment 
as well. The discrepancy between impressive visual memory and unreliable visual 
memory in past research can therefore be accounted for, at least in part, by the act of 
recounting one’s memory. 
 This dissertation also makes several suggestions with regards to the ways in 
which memory can be facilitated or impaired through recounting. In terms of memory 
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enhancement, the retrieval effort account presents a strong case for the mechanism 
underlying the facilitation. When it comes to memory impairment from recounting, 
verbal re-coding and interference from misinformation are two ways in which recounting 
seems to impair visual memory. This is not to say, however, that other explanations for 
the memory facilitation and impairment are invalid. In future efforts to map out the 
nature of memory and determine the way it works, researchers should consider all 
theories of memory presented in the field, and bear in mind that memory is complex and 
dynamic, and may have different mechanisms at play depending on the situation. A 
continued effort to refine our understanding of which mechanisms underlie memory in 
different situations would be invaluable to comprehending the complexity of memory. 
 This dissertation also examined the common act of recounting our memories in 
social communication. In situations where familiarity and shared knowledge are absent, 
coupled with brief exposure to what was seen, our verbal descriptions are, unfortunately, 
of limited utility to others. This limitation of verbal reports is important to keep in mind 
when deciding how much weight to place on verbal reports of what was seen, especially 
in higher stakes situations. Further research into the mechanisms underlying the 
translation of one’s visual memory to others can lead to a greater understanding of not 
only how this translation can be made more effective, but also help determine when a 
verbal description is more reliable. By examining the correspondence between one’s 
verbal report and their subsequent ability to remember what was seen again, we can also 
gain greater insight into the nature of memory itself. 
 What might account for the discrepancy between the effects of recounting on the 
describers (i.e., the participants) versus the listeners (i.e., the judges)? Why does 
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recounting lead to benefits in one’s memory in the long term, but have limited usefulness 
for someone else? One possible reason is that recounting activates an experience in the 
describers such that it serves to strengthen those memories during recounting. In third 
parties, however, these corresponding experiences do not exist. Therefore, the recounted 
memories do not activate an internal representation in judges like they might do in 
participants. The judges’ need to rely completely on the participants’ descriptions in their 
selections, making them more vulnerable to the detrimental effects that recounting can 
bring. Any misinformation included in the descriptions would likely affect judges more 
than participants due to the absence of any other memory representations, and therefore, 
cues, in the judges’ minds. Further research is needed to confirm whether these ideas hold 
true across all situations. 
 As future researchers embark on these questions of how memory works and build 
on what has already been found, it is crucial to keep in mind the importance of the 
reproducibility of scientific findings (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Without 
replicability, scientific findings should not be treated as the be all and end all, but rather 
as steps that bring us closer to the truth. The quest to understand the nature of memory is 
a daunting, but exciting, one. The findings in this dissertation grant some clarity about the 
dynamic nature of our memories and serve as another stone on which future research can 
build. 
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